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This chapter presents a number of approaches that economists have used in studying
neighborhood e®ects in housing markets. It emphasizes how individuals in e®ect choose
neighborhood e®ects, or more generally social interactions, via their location decisions. The
chapter looks constructively at neighborhood e®ects and rather than reviewing the role of
neighborhood e®ects as mere externalities that might interfere with locational equilibrium,
and focuses on what we have learned empirically about their role by observing locational
decisions along with individual and group characteristics. It examines several classes of
models which economists have relied upon in exploring the role and empirical signi¯cance of
neighborhood e®ects that originate in housing markets. It takes the concept of neighborhood
e®ects quite literally as arising in residential neighborhoods. For precisely this reason, the
chapter emphasizes how we may detect empirically the presence of neighborhood e®ects when
they may be priced by housing markets and be capitalized into housing values and rents.
The chapter focuses on models that are empirically relevant and help identify neighborhood
e®ects, and discusses actual empirical ¯ndings.
The ¯rst class of models examined involves models of choice over discrete sets of individual
dwelling units that allow for a multidimensional bundle of characteristics. Models of this
type borrow from the industrial organization literature and especially the Berry{Levisohn{
Pakes characteristics-based models. They lead naturally to hedonic models in the presence
of sorting. In the terminology of the neighborhood e®ects literature, these models allow for
endogenous contextual e®ects. The chapter turns next to a speci¯c application that also
endogenizes contextual e®ects at a much lower level of dimensionality. Individuals choose
neighborhoods while recognizing that their neighbors' characteristics, which are correlated
with their own, along with their own characteristics determine educational outcomes for
their children. This approach allows us to obtain equilibrium housing price functions that
2are consistent with hedonic valuation of neighborhood attributes.
The chapter reviews in depth an approach to neighborhood choice, with endogenous and
contextual neighborhood e®ects, and housing demand (with housing being measured as a
scalar) as joint decisions. This approach is designed to utilize individual and neighborhood-
level data at several levels of aggregation and links naturally with hierarchical choice models.
The chapter next reviews neighborhood e®ects within the canonical Alonso{Mills{Muth
urban model with a well de¯ned spatial structure and individuals commuting to a prede-
termined central business district. If individuals di®er with respect to income or preference
characteristics, then the standard urban model implies segregation. The paper discusses
extensions of the model that allow for amenities, that may be exogenous or endogenous and
are spatially dispersed.
The chapter also reviews hierarchical models of neighborhood location in the presence
of social interactions. These models describe communities in terms of a low-dimensional
vector of attributes that are aggregated into a public good whose consumption is non-rival.
Individuals' choice of community is subject to community-speci¯c housing prices and tax
rates, which at equilibrium must sustain individuals' choices. This approach is designed to
utilize community-level data, along with information on the community-speci¯c distributions
of various socio-demographic characteristics of individuals.
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Individuals and ¯rms regularly face location decisions that require them to assess a mul-
titude of factors. Households who decide where to live within urban areas consider access
to transportation routes, to schools, and to various local and city-wide amenities. Local
amenities range from attractive buildings and natural scenery (in the form of parks and
natural settings), on one hand, to characteristics (and even habits) of other residents close
by and to activities in which those other individuals engage. Downtown areas of vibrant
cities are often acting as magnets for a variety of formal and informal activities. Music,
theater and all forms of cultural and entertainment activities as well as public buildings
that themselves connote history and culture confer character to city centers throughout the
world. Occasionally, however, changing fads shift attention to other areas within a single
large metropolis. In fact, di®erent areas may coexist o®ering mixes of diverse activities, and
at the end, conferring character to entire metropolitan areas, as well.
Some of these activities are so persistent that they come to signal elements of special-
ization for particular locales within large cities. The West End and the City in London,
the Left Bank in Paris, downtown New York, Harvard Square in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Hollywood and Santa Monica in Los Angeles, and so on are cases in point. This can also be
said about large cities and metropolitan areas throughout the world, and regardless of the
state of development. Why is it that urban activities sometimes conspire to produce true
world landmarks and evoke of great things and other times result in failures? All such urban
features are manmade. The theories reviewed in this chapter take the view that they are
all driven by individuals' quest for being near other individuals, either because of who those
others are or of what they do. In a nutshell, they are driven by neighborhood e®ects.
The recent explosion of interest in the role of social interactions calls for a framework for
thinking about these questions. Speci¯cally, it is important to be able to distinguish between
di®erent e®ects within individuals' social milieus. Being guided by the canonical framework
proposed by Charles Manski [ Manski (1993; 2000) ], in particular, we wish to distinguish
between di®erent types of social e®ects. Consider ¯rst that individuals may value economic
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neighbors remodel their house, or simply keep up its maintenance in ways that shame me,
if I do not keep up. My children's hearing of academic, athletic and other accomplishments
of other children in the neighborhood motivates them to imitate them or even to react in a
non-conformist way. These types of e®ects are known as endogenous social e®ects, because
they originate in deliberate decisions by members of one's reference groups. Groups of people
who regularly interact amongst themselves, form, often by choice, reference groups.
Individuals may value the actual characteristics of others in their social and residential
milieus and deliberately seek to choose among alternative sets of such characteristics. E®ects
that originate in the characteristics of members of one's reference groups are known as
exogenous, or contextual e®ects, and are, of course, social e®ects. When di®erent individuals
tend to act similarly because they possess similar characteristics or face similar institutional
environments, we say that they are subject to correlated e®ects. Naturally, all these e®ects
may coexist, posing challenging problems when one wishes to distinguish econometrically
among them.1 There may be very good reasons, including for the purpose of policy design,
to want to distinguish among them.
For example, how can policy a®ect social outcomes at the urban neighborhood or commu-
nity level? Speci¯cally, in the context of the urban economy, could we engineer improvements
in living conditions for the residents of \depressed" or disadvantaged areas, by encouraging
the relocation of individuals with particular characteristics? Two actual policy options are
worth contemplating in this context, and operate on the supply and demand, respectively.
Increasing the supply of a®ordable housing within otherwise high-housing cost communities
is one such policy option. Residents who value proximity to demographically more diverse
groups would be better o®, but others might be worse o®. The net e®ect depends on neigh-
borhood e®ects. Another policy is subsidizing the relocation of low-income households out
of disadvantaged and into more prosperous communities. Again, neighborhood e®ects in
the form of role models may confer bene¯ts on relocated households, but they may impact
1See Durlauf and Ioannides (2010) for a review of the state-of-the-art on the estimation of social interac-
tions models.
7adversely incumbent households. Related conceptually are such important matters as what
determines the character of urban communities, their ambience. Whether policy may a®ect
urban ambience depends on neighborhood e®ects. If such e®ects are absent, those policies
may have e®ects only through prices.
Individuals decide about joining clubs (or gated communities, or other types of residential
communities with controlled access, like New York City co-ops) in order to avail themselves
of the associated services being o®ered. But individuals also value clubs precisely because
they allow them greater choice over the types of other individuals they are likely to interact
with. Individuals sort themselves across such voluntary associations. Individuals choosing
public communities and neighborhoods avail themselves of access to community-based and
typically shared amenities. The fact that many amenities of communities are open to the
public, regardless of residence, implies a lesser degree of control over who one would likely
come into contact with. However, the cost of housing and community-based taxes serve as
(indirect) admission prices.
This discussion helps clarify the broader issues associated with community formation.
Availability of excludable services and access to nonexcludable local public goods combine to
de¯ne attractiveness of a community. New residents enter, as long as expected attractiveness
dominates other options. Since housing prices help ration access to public communities, it
follows that market prices themselves re°ect, and therefore also proxy for, the set of attributes
that characterize communities, including social e®ects. Precisely because individuals take
the price of a good as given and beyond their control, and make their decisions according to
the enjoyment they expect to derive from di®erent alternatives, equilibrium prices aggregate
information and operate as signals of the characteristics of all market participants. It is
also information about non-participants as well, to the extent that some individuals may be
priced out of a particular market, that help de¯ne its bounds.
In deciding whether or not to locate in a particular city or neighborhood, individuals
weigh all relevant factors, such as market variables, like prices and rents, contextual variables
and endogenous e®ects. They do so from their own perspectives and by forming expecta-
tions about what these e®ects are likely to be. In other words, populations of heterogenous
8individuals sort themselves into di®erent communities. When they do locate by pursuing
optimizing strategies, their individual characteristics once they have been aggregated con-
tribute to de¯ning prices and the distributions of characteristics by location. Thus, they help
de¯ne a social equilibrium for a set of communities. It is in this sense that housing prices
are hedonic prices, a concept that we will explore further in the remainder of this chapter.
Some of the sorting we observe is of course sorting on directly, or even indirectly, observ-
able information. An example of the latter is that families might seek information on the
quality of publicly provided education, recreation, and other such amenities, which is often
widely available in the US context, before deciding where to locate. This is the focus of
much of the research on hedonic prices whose pitfalls are better understood due to extensive
research that has followed the in°uential work of Rosen (1974).
As Rosen (2002) underscores, it is important to assess such sorting in order to, inter
alia, understand the social valuation of neighborhood amenities when individuals di®er in
terms of preferences. For example, if neighborhood safety is valued di®erently by di®erent
people, those who value it less sort to less safe neighborhoods. Estimating the average value
of neighborhood safety to society based on valuations by those who sort to less safe neigh-
borhoods would bias it downwards, and vice versa for those who sort to safer neighborhoods.
With sorting, we are likely to see di®erent types of neighborhoods di®ering with respect to
prevailing neighborhood safety. In practice, how do we know what particular factors are
most important in individuals' decisions? And what if some of those are unobservable, or
involve social interactions? Sorting that rests on unobservables makes it di±cult to deter-
mine which factors are responsible for sustaining neighborhoods and communities that di®er
signi¯cantly in terms of attributes. There is an inherent di±culty in distinguishing among
alternative factors that drive individuals' location decisions. Are they due to attraction of
local synergies (or anticipated spillovers from locational decisions of individuals) or to un-
derlying and possibly only partly unobservable natural advantages? In either case, these
factors work to bring and hold people together.
This chapter elaborates further on the role of social interactions in location decisions by
individuals by working with both aspatial and spatial models. The latter type of models
9result by placing a location model within an urban space setting with a well de¯ned geo-
graphic metric, like distance from a city center. The former are akin to choosing membership
to a social group from among a number of alternative social groups. Whereas clubs may
exclude at will individuals from becoming members, access to communities is subject to free
entry and is rationed by market-determined housing prices and taxes, which are set by local
governments. This also suggests an element of similarity between social interactions and
local public goods.
General multinomial choice models, as for example the one invoked by Brock and Durlauf
(2002; 2007), are readily capable of handling aspatial location decisions. Some of the location
decisions examined here are quite closely related to group choice. Such a general framework
allows one to study multidimensional attributes of a decision, like the size of a dwelling unit
and its di®erent characteristics, including its location. It is natural to think that several
attributes of a location decision emanate from a single optimization problem. For example,
location is a discrete choice from among alternative sets of opportunities (such as commu-
nities), within each of which individuals may select continuous quantities of interest. Of
course, such decision structures are testable, in principle.
While this chapter aims at understanding the choice of housing in the presence of neigh-
borhood e®ects, the approach applies equally well to choice in labor markets, and to joint
housing and job location. Adapting a stochastic location model to an urban setting allows
us to evaluate the role of proximity to urban centers | the hallmark of urban economics |
and of the characteristics of one's neighbors when all location decisions are endogenous.
The ¯rst class of models we examine in section 2.1 below involves models of choice over
discrete sets of individual dwelling units that allow for multidimensional bundles of char-
acteristics. Models of these types, which borrow from the industrial organization literature
and especially the Berry{Levisohn{Pakes characteristics-based models [Berry (1994); Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995; 2004)], have been developed by Bayer and a number of coau-
thors. They lead naturally to hedonic models while sorting is accounted for. In the context
of the neighborhood e®ects literature, these models allow for endogenous contextual e®ects.
We pursue further in section 2.5 a conceptually related approach, due to Nesheim, that
10also endogenizes contextual e®ects but involves much lower dimensionality. That is, individ-
uals choose neighborhoods while recognizing that their neighbors' characteristics along with
their own determine educational outcomes for their children. This approach allows us to
obtain in closed form equilibrium housing price functions that are consistent with hedonic
valuation of neighborhood attributes.
The paper turns next to aspatial models of neighborhood choice, with endogenous and
contextual neighborhood e®ects, and housing demand (with housing measured as a scalar) as
joint decisions. It emphasizes a model, due to Ioannides and Zabel (2008), which is designed
to utilize individual and neighborhood-level data at several levels of aggregation. This ap-
proach links naturally with hierarchical choice models. Hierarchical models of neighborhood
location, which originate in Epple and Sieg (1999) and have been developed further by Epple
and several other co-authors, describe communities in terms of a low-dimensional vector of
attributes that may be aggregated into a public good. Individuals' choice of community is
subject to community-speci¯c housing price and tax rate, which at equilibrium must sus-
tain individuals' choices. This approach is designed to utilize data that are aggregated at
the community-level and to match them with the community-speci¯c distributions of vari-
ous socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. When considered against hedonic-type
models, the housing price again does double duty, by pricing housing and \admission" into
communities (or neighborhoods). In these models, sorting across communities works either
only through individuals' valuation of community-speci¯c amenities or (in their most recent
versions) with community-speci¯c amenities combined with neighborhood e®ects in the form
of contextual e®ects.
The chapter also takes up neighborhood e®ects within the canonical Alonso{Mills{Muth
urban model with a well de¯ned spatial structure and individuals commuting to a prede-
termined central business district. If individuals di®er with respect to income or preference
characteristics, then the standard urban model implies segregation. The paper discusses ex-
tensions of the model that allow for amenities, that may be exogenous or endogenous and are
spatially dispersed, and naturally in°uence individuals' location decisions and the associated
housing price structure.
112 Aspatial Models of Location with Social Interactions
The models and empirical results that we present ¯rst in e®ect treat symmetrically the entire
set of factors that determine location decisions. We start with a speci¯c model that originates
in a broader line of research that emphasizes social interactions that have consequences for
individuals' decisions, in general as well as in particular in the context of housing decisions.
We refer to such models as aspatial because they do not aim at explaining the spatial
organization of urban neighborhoods nor urban geometry as such, and therefore do not
make distance from the central business district (CBD) a key element of the analysis.
Location decisions are interesting in the context of social interactions because proximity
to others is a key attribute of housing and enters housing decisions, more generally. Neigh-
bors typically know one another and may acquire intimate knowledge of each others' habits
and indeed lives. The composition of urban neighborhoods in terms of the socioeconomic
characteristics of their residents and the mix of economic and social activities is an important
element of their attractiveness [ c.f. Becker and Murphy (2000) ]. Di®erent communities
di®er in terms of density of settlement, quality of amenities and public services, distance
to employment centers and to transportation systems, to name just a few. Our analysis of
aspatial models probes our understanding of what brings and holds people together.
2.1 Models of Choice among Individual Dwelling Units
In the models we discuss here, di®erent dwelling units are seen as di®erentiated commodities,
with di®erentiation in a multitude of dimensions. The basic model in this class of papers is
essentially an application of the di®erentiated products approach, typically being referred to
as the BLP approach [Berry (1994); Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)], to housing markets.
It is a natural approach to housing decisions, precisely because dwelling units are hardly a
standardized commodity.
In the papers by Bayer et al., households choose among individual dwelling units taking
into consideration exogenous characteristics of neighborhoods in which units lie as well the
12characteristics of neighbors, in other words, contextual e®ects. We start from the basic
model, as presented in Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007a, 2007b) and Bayer, McMillan,
and Rueben (2005). Individual i; i 2 I; values a dwelling unit h in terms of a vector, Xh;
of characteristics which includes dwelling size, age, type, tenure status, and neighborhood
characteristics such as crime, school quality, socioeconomic composition of neighborhood and
geography. Dwelling unit h carries a price ph: Household i chooses its residence from among
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where the random variable »h is speci¯c to dwelling unit h; and thus common to all households
that consider that unit, and captures the unobserved quality of the unit and its neighborhood;
and "i
h denotes a random variable that household i draws from a speci¯ed distribution.
Associated with the de¯nition of the choice set is the appropriate price ph that enter the
choice probabilities.
It is an important component of the BLP approach that the set of magnitudes ®i
X;®i
p be
speci¯ed as functions of individual characteristics as follows:
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where r indexes the components of the vector of observable characteristics Zi; that is individ-
ual i's own socioeconomic characteristics.2 With this speci¯cation, it is possible to rewrite
V i
h from (1) so as to distinguish a unit h¡speci¯c term, mean indirect utility ±h;
±h = ®0XXh ¡ ®0pph + »h; (3)




























2The stochastic structure in Berry et al. (1995) is even more general.
13It is straightforward to obtain the probability of individual i's choice of dwelling unit h
from her choice set h 2 Hi; once that choice set and the distribution from which the "i
h's
are drawn have been speci¯ed. While it is convenient to assume that the stochastic shock
"i
h in (4) is extreme-value distributed, as Bayer et al. in fact do, in view of Ellickson (1981)
it is not necessary to do so.3 If the "i
hs are extreme-value distributed of type II, with mean
zero, variance ¼2
6%2; and mode ¡EC
% ; where EC = 0:5772; Euler's constant, then the choice











where we have normalized by setting % = 1 in (5). Given characteristics of dwelling units Xh
and of individuals Zi; and a speci¯cation of the distribution of unobservable characteristic
in Eq. (3), »h, estimation of the discrete choice model by means of maximum likelihood
naturally forces the probabilities that each unit would be occupied to sum up to 1 [ op. cit.,
Equ. (12) ]. The estimation process delivers estimates of the ±h's, that is, the unit-speci¯c
component of the valuation, ±h = ®0XXh ¡ ®0pph + »h; for each of the units in the sample.
Note also that all of the data that enter the problem bear upon the estimation of the ±h's. We
may also estimate ®rX;®rp: It is then possible, in principle, to estimate parameters (®0X;®0p)
and the distribution of the »h's along the lines of (3), by using the estimated unit-speci¯c
±hs as dependent variables in a second-stage regression.
Although »h itself may be speci¯ed stochastically to be independent of the other regres-
sors, the values of the variables that are associated with a particular unit h; Xh;ph are
themselves subject to selection bias. This applies particularly to the price that is appropri-
ate for each unit. It is this key issue that motivates our approach to hedonic theory further
below.
Bayer et al. recognize this and follow the original BLP literature by instrumenting the
price by means of attributes of houses and neighborhoods beyond the immediate neigh-
borhood of where a particular household has chosen to live. Such instruments contain in-
3The theory of extreme order statistics o®ers conditions under which the extreme value distribution
emerges as a limit of a bidding process that underlies the allocation of dwellings to individuals. See Ellickson
(1981) and JaÄ ³bi and ten Raa (1998).
14formation about the overall housing demand but are assumed to be uncorrelated with the
realizations of the speci¯c variables that enter the determination of demand in the immediate
vicinity of unit h: As they put it, such an instrumenting strategy exploits an inherent feature
of the sorting process | that the overall demand for houses in a particular neighborhood
is a®ected not only by the features of the neighborhood itself, but also by the way these
features relate to the broader landscape of houses and neighborhoods in the region.
2.2 Hedonic Price Indices
The development so far addresses the valuation of di®erent dwelling units by individuals.
What does this model imply about the market valuations of di®erent dwelling units? A
simple way to start is to exclude ¸i
h from the de¯nition of unit-speci¯c utility (4). This
forces the estimates of ±h to be equal for all units, and may therefore be set equal to 0.
When the individualized component of utility, ¸i
h; is excluded, then the estimates of ±h are








This is like a standard hedonic price regression that relates dwelling unit prices ph to their
observable characteristics Xh and to unobservable characteristics of their neighborhoods.
However, suppression of the individualized component ¸i
h removes contextual e®ects from
the model of housing demand. The upshot of this is that regressors controlling for attributes
that are positively correlated with the vector of indirect utilities will have coe±cients that
will be downwards biased.
There is another noteworthy aspect of hedonic regressions. Units chosen by a particular
group of the population will be associated with higher utility due to revealed preference, by
an amount given by the term ±h in (4). By omitting those terms from the estimation would
lead to understating the willingness to pay for unit characteristics.
It is possible to obtain a systematic accounting for these e®ects. We ¯rst obtain an
expression that summarizes the value to a decision maker associated with the choice process.
The expected value ~ V i

























h] ¢ dFXh; (7)
where FXh denotes the distribution of dwelling unit characteristics. The full distribution,
not just the mean, is also available in closed form.4
Working in a dual fashion, we de¯ne the market valuation of each unit as the outcome of
bidding among the set of individuals, i 2 I: Under our assumptions, the maximum valuation
































This may be simpli¯ed by de¯ning ~ À ´ `n[
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h] ¢ dFZ; (8)
where FZ denote the cumulative distribution function of the vector of characteristics of all
individuals (Zi)I:
A number of remarks are in order. First, note that the above derivation of the hedonic
price index is consistent with the standard de¯nition of a hedonic index as the outer envelope
of individual expenditure functions, where they are parameterized by income. Indeed, it does
not depend on individuals' incomes. Second, note the symmetry between the expected value
4See Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992). While it is noteworthy that under the assumption of the
multinomial logit model, the expected maximum utilities, conditional on choice, are all equal to the overall
expected maximum utility [Anas and Feng (1998)], this does not invalidate our approach. The multinomial
logit model is invoked as a matter of analytical convenience here.
16of maximum utility attained by a particular individual i; and the maximum valuation of unit
h generated by the market, given by (7) and (8), respectively. Both involve averaging over
characteristics, the former averaging over characteristics of units, Xh; and the latter over
characteristics of individuals, Zi:
To see the importance of selection correction bias that may underlie hedonic calculations,
we compare the expected maximum valuation of unit h with the average valuation of unit h
by the entire population of individuals. That is, compare (8) with the average value of (4)
over the entire population of individuals:






h ¢ dFZi: (9)
Therefore, it follows that the average valuation understates the actual valuation, as implied
by the choice model and given by (8). It is the latter that would be the outcome of the
bidding process and should be the basis for the hedonic function that is associated with
models of housing decisions involving choices over individual units.
Assuming alternative use of resources for supplying dwelling unit h into the market allows
us to ¯x the value, at equilibrium, of the left hand side of (8) above. Then, solving it in terms
of ph yields a hedonic price index for dwelling units with associated characteristics. Again,
note that dwelling unit characteristics are interacted with the distributions of individual
characteristics in arriving at the hedonic price function. Consider, for simplicity, that ®jp =


























Therefore, the bias that excluding the individualized component of utility would cause on
unit valuation, as in (6), is given by the last term in the above expression for the hedonic
price index.
2.3 Overview of Empirical Findings by Bayer et al.
Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2007a) use the BLP approach, as explained above, by spec-
ifying utility from occupying a particular dwelling unit as a function of its price, of its
17characteristics and of characteristics of its neighborhood. The corresponding coe±cients
are individualized by being de¯ned as explicit functions of individual characteristics. The
model is applied to data at the level of the Census block from the San Francisco Bay area.
Speci¯cally, these authors use data from six counties in the San Francisco Bay area, which
encompass about 650,000 individuals in 244,000 households who reside within 1,100 Census
tracts that contain almost 39,000 Census blocks. The household data are obtained from
the 1990 long Census forms and are geocoded down to the Census block level, a group of
about 100 dwelling units. A vast amount of information that is available in the long Census
forms and unavailable from other Census-based data sets, including incomes from a variety
of sources as well as socio-demographic characteristics, are used in the estimations. These
authors have complemented the restricted-access Census data with data from the complete
set of housing transactions in the San Francisco Bay Area between 1992 and 1996. These
data are based on county-level public records, and contain detailed information about every
housing unit sold during that period, including the exact transaction price and the exact
street address. The authors were able to add some additional characteristics by means of data
collected in accordance with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). These additional
data allow them to investigate the robustness of their ¯ndings.
These authors embed the boundary discontinuity design (BDD) [Black (1999); Lee and
Lemieux (2010)] in their estimation model by including school attendance zone boundary
¯xed e®ects in hedonic price regressions to control for the correlation of school quality and
unobserved neighborhood quality. They extend Black's approach to deal with the systematic
correlation of neighborhood socio-demographic characteristics and unobserved neighborhood
quality, and to help identify the full distribution of household preferences for schools and
neighbors. They provide new estimates of household preferences for schools and neighbors.
Speci¯cally, their key insight is that to the extent that one can control for di®erences in
school quality on opposite sides of the a boundary, a boundary discontinuity design provides
a plausible way to estimate the value that households place on the characteristics of their
immediate neighbors. Using hedonic price regressions they show that the inclusion of bound-
ary ¯xed e®ects reduces the magnitudes of the coe±cients on the income and education of
18one's neighbors by 25 and 60 percent, respectively. Thus higher-income and better-educated
households seem to select into neighborhoods with better amenities. They also ¯nd that
the coe±cient on the fraction of black neighbors declines to zero, in sharp contrast to neg-
ative correlation of housing prices with the fraction of black neighbors typically observed
and reported systematically in the previous literature. The authors argue that this is due
to correlation of race and the unobserved neighborhood quality captured by the boundary
¯xed e®ect.
Generally, they ¯nd that hedonic price regression coe±cients are generally very close to
mean preferences for housing and neighborhood attributes that vary more or less continu-
ously throughout the metropolitan area, including school quality and neighborhood income
and education. In contrast, they ¯nd that estimated mean preferences for black neighbors
di®er markedly from hedonic estimates and are signi¯cantly negative. This underscores the
importance of their method, since for blacks, who make up less than 10 percent of the popu-
lation, mean and marginal households are far apart. Their analysis implies that, conditional
on neighborhood income, households prefer to self-segregate on the basis of both race and
education.
Such detail allows the authors to develop, inter alia, innovative new instruments for hous-
ing prices, in order to explore the economic e®ects of access to such neighborhood amenities
as good schools and less crime, to examine in greater depth patterns in residential segregation
[ Bayer, McMillan and Reuben (2004a; 2004b; 2009) ], and to estimate the full equilibrium
e®ects of preferences for educational quality. That is, these e®ects include the direct valua-
tion of educational quality as well as the indirect one via the fact that preferences for peers
and neighbors who in turn (because of sorting) themselves value education more than the
average individual. Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007b) use general equilibrium simula-
tions based on the estimates reported in Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007a) to explore
the size of social multiplier e®ects associated with increases in school quality as households
re-sort. Such a social multiplier aspect of the preferences of neighborhood amenities and for
school quality, in this particular case, is akin to the role of endogenous social e®ects more
generally and has been overlooked by the literature.
192.4 Discrete Location Problems with Endogenous and Contextual
E®ects
Bayer and Timmins (2005; 2007) emphasize problems associated with estimating models of
location decisions in the presence of local spillovers measured by the number (and charac-
teristics) of other agents (individuals or ¯rms) who also choose the same or nearby locations
at equilibrium. These are instances of endogenous social e®ects. As a number of authors
have emphasized, using observations on patterns of locational decisions make it hard for a
researcher to distinguish between the role played in the behavioral model by local spillovers,
as opposed to underlying natural advantages, which may also be present and a®ect decisions.
As they put it, in any model of sorting across locations, aggregate location decisions can be
entirely accounted for by a vector of location-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects, which intermingle the
in°uence of both natural advantages and local spillovers.
In order to disentangle the impact of unobserved local factors, Bayer and Timmins explore
a source of potential instruments which is similar to those used in the Bayer et al. work on
housing decisions, which was discussed earlier. That is, they use functions of characteristics
of other locations which individuals could have chosen but did not, which are correlated with
the fractions and characteristics of individuals who do choose particular locations but are
uncorrelated with the unobserved ¯xed attributes of those locations.
This particular location problem underscores the power of these types of instruments.
However, it also serves to demonstrate the subtlety of the housing choice problem in the
presence of neighborhood e®ects. As we demonstrate in section 2.5, one of the di±culties of
the housing decision is the fact that equilibrium housing prices themselves are functions of
contextual e®ects and endogenous variable in their own right.
This challenge is underscored by the similarity between the models involved. In particu-
lar, let us now index locations ` instead of dwelling units, as before, and rewrite (1) for the
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where Á` denotes the share of agents who choose location `; and ®i
Á its respective coe±cient,
20and the remainder of the notation is adapted in the obvious way from Section 2.1. As Bayer
and Timmins (2007) indicate, inclusion of the location attribute Á` is meaningful when all
other speci¯c factors that may generate local spillovers that make a location attractive may
not easily characterized structurally. The probability that individual i may choose location





where Zi;X; ¹ Á; ¹ » are the matrix/vector counterparts of the respective variables. By aggre-




Gi`(Zi;X; ¹ Á; ¹ »)df(Z); from which we may
write for all locations, ` 2 L :
© = G(f(Z;X;©;¥): (13)
This system of equations maps [0;1]L into itself, where L = jLj = j
S
` Lij; is the size of the
union of all individuals' discrete choice sets, Li:
We note that in moving from the individual decision, denoted by (12), to the aggregate
(13), we have assumed in e®ect that all agents' location decisions form a static simultaneous
move game, whose Nash equilibria are represented by the ¯xed points of (13). The game
assumes that agents have full information about each other's unobserved components in
the preference structure, ¹ "i = (:::;"i
h;:::): Alternatively, we may assume that agents form
expectations about others' preference parameters. Under the assumption of a continuum of
agents with di®erent values of unobserved parameters these terms may be integrated out,
thus avoiding integer problems.
Similarly to the housing estimation problem discussed above, Bayer and Timmins propose
a two-stage estimation. In the ¯rst stage, the vector of location-speci¯c constants, D =
(:::;±`;:::); is estimated, where
±` = ®0XX` + ®0ÁÁ` + »`; (14)
the arrays (:::;®rX;:::) and (:::;®rÁ;:::); and a stochastic structure for the "i
`'s, the shocks
in (11). These shocks are assumed to be IID across individuals according to a distribution
F(0;§); where the covariance is de¯ned over locations. In the second stage, the estimated
vector ^ D is regressed against attributes of locations X` and Á`: However, the logic of the
21location decisions implies that Á` and »` are correlated and therefore, conditions that would
allow us to recover parameters of interest by regressing the estimated ¯xed e®ects are not
satis¯ed.
Bayer and Timmins propose as instruments the exogenous attributes of location ` and
of other locations which the agents could have chosen but did not do so. They motivate
this choice by what they view as the optimal instrument, the expected share of individuals
who locate at each site, conditional on the full set of exogenous location and individual
characteristics, E(Á`jX;Z): Speci¯cally, they propose as an instrument the predicted share
of each alternative, to be evaluated at the ¯rst stage estimates of the parameter vector while
the unobserved location speci¯c components ¥ = (»1;:::;»`;:::;»L); and the coe±cients of
the local spillover terms, ®0Á; are set equal to zero and only the observed exogenous choice
and individual characteristics are being considered. This neglects the role of local spillovers
but provides a measure of the way that the full landscape, that is based on exogenous features
that are observable, of possible choices enters the problem. That is, the estimation would
be based on the assumption that each individual behaves optimally, given the collection of
choices made by other individuals. We note below that the estimation process in Ioannides
and Zabel (2008) is quite similar in spirit and execution.
In view of the properties of the individual choice model, Equ. (13) may admit a multi-
plicity of equilibria, as Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2007) have emphasized in similar settings
involving social interactions. Bayer and Timmins (2005), Propositions 2 and 3, propose con-
ditions which ensure uniqueness. When such conditions are implausible, one would need to
interpret cautiously the associated identi¯cation issues [Bisin et al. (2009)]. These authors
evaluate the e±ciency and computational feasibility of di®erent approaches to solving the
curse of dimensionality implied by the equilibrium multiplicity. While multiplicities are trou-
blesome in certain settings, they are important in other ones, and their empirical signi¯cance
has been overlooked in the literature. In particular, Brock and Durlauf (2007) develop partial
identi¯cation results for binary choice models under what they argue are weak assumptions
about the distribution of the unobserved group e®ects. They exploit a fundamental di®er-
ence between endogenous e®ects and unobserved group e®ects: only endogenous e®ects can
22produce multiple equilibria. Hence, if evidence of multiple equilibria can be generated, it
represents evidence of endogenous social interactions. Brock and Durlauf consider \pattern
reversals" in group level outcomes. A pattern reversal occurs when the rank order of average
outcomes between two groups is the reverse of what one would predict given the observed
individual and contextual e®ects for the groups. Brock and Durlauf demonstrate that under
various shape restrictions on the probability density of the unobservables, pattern reversals
can only occur because of multiple equilibria and hence endogenous social interactions. For
example, if the distribution of unobservables shifts monotonically in observables, then pat-
tern reversals cannot occur without social interactions. A second approach they propose
involves the bimodality of linear combinations of contextual e®ects. Here Brock and Durlauf
show that, conditioning on a given average outcome, the cross section distribution of certain
linear combinations of contextual variables must be unimodal.
2.5 Endogenous Contextual E®ects and Hedonic Prices: The Nesheim
Model
Here we take up the solution to a model of sorting, originally due to Nesheim (2002), that
allows for contextual e®ects, own income e®ects, and endogenous choice of neighborhood.
Consequently, one can use it to study properties of entire neighborhoods to which individuals
self-select, that is sort. It is important to account for the roles that contextual e®ects,
measured at di®erent scales, play in individuals' decisions. The theory we turn to next
allows for a better understanding of the fundamental economic and social forces that hold
together groups of individuals.
Following Nesheim (2002), I assume that individuals choose their residential location
from among a continuum of locations indexed by `: Individuals consume a unit of housing
each and have preferences over non-housing consumption and their own child's expected
schooling. Locations di®er in terms of an attribute, average neighborhood schooling among
adults, that individuals value as an input to their children's education. Each individual
(household) allocates her income over non-housing consumption, I ¡ R(`); where I and
23R(`); are, respectively, income and unit housing rent at location `; ` 2 R+; and housing,
R(`):
I describe households in terms of a vector of attributes, z = (z1;z2;z3;z4;z5); whose
components are de¯ned respectively as: log of parental schooling, s0 = ez1; log of own
parent's income, I = ez2; log of the child's ability in school, a = ez3; log of a preference
parameter, ¯ = ez4; that weights a child's schooling outcome in the utility function, and a
random shock to schooling outcome, z5; which will be assumed to be uncorrelated with all
other components:
z = (`ns0;`nI;`na;`n¯;z5):
Households maximize utility by choosing location, `: Utility is additively separable in
non-housing consumption, I ¡ R(`); and in expected schooling for the child, conditional on














; ° ¸ 0: (15)
A child's schooling is produced in location ` as described by an educational production
function as a function of: average schooling in `; S(`); own parent's schooling, ez1; the child's




where ´1 and ´2 are positive parameters. The random shock z5 is the only quantity that is
unobservable by the household when it chooses location and is assumed to be independent
of location. Average schooling at each location, S(`); and the housing rent, R(`); are both
endogenous. They are determined consistently with equilibrium sorting of households across
locations.
The sorting equilibrium is de¯ned in terms of: one, a mapping F(z) that assigns household
types z to locations, z 2 Z; F(z) : Z ! R+; and two, a housing rent function R(`); that
equilibrates the housing market in each location, ` 2 R+: S(`), average schooling of parents
who choose to locate in neighborhood `; S(`); is de¯ned as S(`) = E [ez1jz 2 F ¡1(`)]: This
is the location-speci¯c input into the education production function (16).
24Provided that monotonicity holds at equilibrium, it is convenient to represent location
in the utility maximization problem in terms of the average schooling of parents in each
neighborhood, S(`): Consequently, the housing rent function is equivalently de¯ned as a
function of the contextual e®ect, S, p(S); that is instead of rent at location `; R(`):
Nesheim (2002) shows that when ° 6= 0 the di®erential equation that the hedonic price
function must satisfy, does not allow an analytical solution and may only be solved numeri-
cally. Nesheim establishes several general results, such as existence of a unique equilibrium
rent function, provided that groups of individuals with higher average willingness to pay for
education are willing to pay more for high quality locations with higher education [ibid.,
Theorem 5.1]. However, it is possible that the average education of people who choose a
location with a given quality index may decline with the value of the quality index. In that
case, Theorem 5.2, ibid., ensures the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium rent function with
a discontinuous slope. Accordingly, there will be concentrations of individuals of ¯nite mass
at the points of discontinuity. Nesheim shows that this more general model is econometrically
fully identi¯ed.
2.6 A Generalization of the Nesheim Sorting Model
It turns out that by modifying a single assumption in Nesheim (2002), namely that compo-
nent z2 of the vector of individual characteristics z is the level of parental income, not its
log, allows an analytical solution for p(S): The ¯rst order condition for maximizing utility




´2z1+z3+z4 = 0: (17)
Rearranging and taking logs yields
´2z1 + °z2 + z3 + z4 = £(S); (18)
where the marginal quality index is de¯ned as:
£(S) ´ °p(S) + `n[pS(S)] ¡ `n(A0´1) + (1 ¡ ´1)`nS; (19)
25with A0 = E(ez5): This is the marginal e®ect of neighborhood quality on utility, given its
price. The l.h.s. of (18) expresses the marginal willingness to pay for neighborhood quality.
Let ' 'T = (´2;°;1;1;0) denote a vector of parameters. We complete the description of
the problem by de¯ning average neighborhood schooling, that is, the average schooling of
adults who choose location S :
S = E fe
z1j'z = £(S)g: (20)
Those who choose a particular neighborhood are de¯ned in terms of their characteristics,
as implied by (18). If z » N(¹;§); then the log education of parents who choose loca-
tion S is by the properties of the multivariate normal distribution normally distributed:
(z1j'Tz = £(S)) » N (e ¹1; e ¾2
1); with mean and variance given by






















1 ´ (1;0;0;0;0); denotes the square of the correlation coe±cient
between log education of parents and willingness to pay for neighborhood quality. Clearly,
due to sorting, the variance of the log education of parents, conditional on the willingness
to pay for neighborhood quality is less than in the entire population.
Using de¯nition (20) with the ¯rst-order condition for utility maximization (17), inte-























where the auxiliary variables L0;L1; as functions of preference parameters and of the param-








Note that L1 is the regression coe±cient from the regression of log-education of parents on
the willingness to pay for neighborhood quality [c.f., Nesheim, op. cit. p. 33].
262.7 Properties of the Hedonic Price Function
The equilibrium price function is increasing in S: Analysis of its second derivative shows
that the equilibrium price function is convex for low values of S and up to a threshold
point, and concave thereafter, provided that ´1 + 1
L1 > 1; ° > 0: Thus, the equilibrium
rent function exhibits a key property of social interactions models: the equilibrium rent is a
sigmoid function of average neighborhood quality.
In view of the de¯nition of L1 above, the regression coe±cient from the regression of
log-education of parents on the willingness to pay for neighborhood quality, this condition
involves restrictions in terms of parameters and of the stochastic structure:
´1 +
ÁT§Á
´2¾11 + °¾21 + ¾31 + ¾41
> 1:
As expected from hedonic price theory, an individual's marginal valuation of neighbor-
hood quality, the hedonic demand equation (18), depends on the individual's income, but the
equilibrium rent function (??) depends, via the auxiliary functions L0;L1; on the statistics
of the income distribution and its joint distribution with the other characteristics of interest.
Average neighborhood quality, that is schooling, chosen by an individual with character-




















L1 = ~ A0e
´2z1+°z2+z3+z4;
where ~ A0 ´ A0´1L
1
L1
0 : The choice of neighborhood for an individual with characteristics
(z1;z2;z3;z4) is implicitly determined by the roots of the above equation. Given a solution
for S; S = S(z1;z2;z3;z4): Then a child's education follows from (16), `s1 = ´2z1 +z3 +z5 +
´1S(z1;z2;z3;z4): The dependence of a child's education on z2; parental income, is brought
in via S:
The magnitude of L1 does a®ect the sensitivity of S with respect to the willingness to pay
for neighborhood quality. If L1 < 1 and ´1 + 1
L1 < 1; then there will, in general and subject
to feasibility conditions, exist two solutions. For only one of them, the smaller in magnitude,
it would be the case that neighborhood education increases with willingness to pay for it and
27with income, in particular. This is also the case if ´1+ 1
L1 > 1; and provided the value is not
too large. Both solutions are in principle acceptable, but they have di®erent properties. For
example, the larger of the two solutions implies that individuals with more own schooling
choose neighborhoods with lower average schooling, which in turn implies lower schooling
for their children. In other words, depending upon parameter values, the model allows for
schooling to be either a normal or an inferior good.
Another example of the fruitfulness of this approach is to consider the distribution of






» N (e ¹2; e ¾22);
with mean and variance given by:
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¾22('T§'); denotes the square of the correlation coe±cient between the income of
parents and the willingness to pay for neighborhood quality, and the solution (21) is used in
the expression for £(S); in (19). In this case, function £(S) becomes:
£(S) ´ ¡`n( ~ A0) +
1
L1



















The conditional distribution of education of parents who choose S has a lognormal distribu-
tion, (z1j'Tz = £(S)) » N (e ¹1; e ¾11); where
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¾11('T§'); denotes the square of the correlation coe±cient between log education
of parents and willingness to pay for neighborhood quality.
2.8 The Special Case of No Income E®ects













28This solution is also implied by (21), for small values of S:5 The elasticity of the equilibrium
rent function with respect to neighborhood quality S; in the absence of income e®ects, ´1+ 1
L1;
is intuitive. The larger is ´1; the larger price di®erentials must be to segregate individuals
into their preferred locations. The larger is L1; the regression coe±cient of log-education
of parents on the willingness to pay for neighborhood quality, the less parents are willing
to pay directly for neighborhood quality, since they contribute indirectly through their own
education and therefore the smaller the price di®erentials are required to be to maintain
segregation of households at equilibrium. The equilibrium price function (22) is convex
(concave), if ´1 + 1
L1 > (<)1: However, for the solution to be meaningful, ´1 + 1
L1 > 0:
Such endogenous distributions of interest as of education and of income of parents who
choose neighborhood education S readily follow. First, neighborhood quality as a function of
S becomes: £(S) ´ ¡ 1
L1`nL0¡`n(A0´1)+ 1




The log of average neighborhood schooling chosen by individual with characteristics z is lin-
ear in L1(´2z1+z3+z4); where the e®ect of individual characteristics is moderated by L1: The
larger is L1; the regression of log-education of parents on the willingness to pay for neighbor-
hood quality, the more neighborhood quality parents are willing to purchase directly, since
this makes their own education more e®ective in ensuring greater segregation of households
at equilibrium.
Also interesting is the relationship between the child's education and household charac-
teristics. That is, from (16), by using the solution for S yields:
`ns1 = a0 + ´2(1 + ´1L1)z1 + (1 + ´1L1)z3 + ´1L1z4 + z5; (23)
where a0 is a function of parameters. The intergenerational evolution of schooling is deter-
mined by ´2(1 + ´1L1); the coe±cient of the log of parents' schooling.
It is now clear how restrictive the typical hedonic price literature approach is, whereby es-
timates are sought for arbitrary functional forms for the relationship between the (marginal)
valuation for neighborhood amenities as a function of observables and unobservables. In
5For large values of S; the second term within the brackets in the RHS of (21) dominates the ¯rst, thus















29contrast, Nesheim's theory exactly determines the equilibrium rent, as a function of contex-
tual characteristics, and this in turn characterizes sorting. As Nesheim (2002) shows, this
particular model is not entirely identi¯ed, although groups of parameters may be identi¯ed
by means of data on observable educational outcomes as a function of parental education,
neighborhood school quality, and income.
If individuals value the characteristics of their neighbors, then as an outcome of their
choice of location their neighbors' characteristics are correlated with their own. Similarly,
if certain individual outcomes that households care about, like educational attainment of
children, depend on characteristics of the neighbors, then unobservable characteristics of
individuals are likely to be correlated with neighborhood characteristics. If children's ability
increases the productivity of neighborhood quality in producing education, then people who
know they have high ability children will move to high quality neighborhoods. This leads to
sorting: higher quality neighborhoods will have higher unobserved ability.
Such neighborhood e®ects on schooling have been posited as stylized facts and addressed
by typically atheoretical papers, such as Brooks{Gunn et al. (1993), who emphasize the
importance of sorting bias, and Kremer (1997), who estimates schooling as a function of
parental schooling and neighborhood schooling and assesses the implied role of sorting in
inequality. Ioannides (2003) shows empirically that non-linearities in the general relation-
ship, whose special case is estimated by Kremer (1997), may alter his key results.. Graham
(2008) seeks to identify the causal e®ects of parental schooling and neighborhood schooling,
while recognizing that parents choose the neighborhoods where they bring up their children.
His model of intertemporal optimization yields an Euler-like equation, which links the he-
donic price of housing to parental schooling, neighborhood schooling and total ability and
is the counterpart of (19). Its integration yields a hedonic price as an isoelastic function of
neighborhood schooling, an exact counterpart of (22), and thus less general than my gener-
alization of Nesheim's example (21). Below in section 5.2, we discuss broadly related results
that are obtained by means of an Epple-type model [Calabrese et al. (2006)].
302.8.1 Housing Price as an Empirical Control for Neighborhood Quality
Nesheim (2002) reports estimation results with data from the US National Educational
Longitudinal Survey for 1998. He demonstrates the key di±culty in estimating the model,
the dependence at equilibrium between marginal price and neighborhood quality. However,
use of di®erent data sets, which can allow controlling for additional determinants of housing
price, can facilitate identi¯cation. For example, the con¯dential version of the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics links individual and parental characteristics to the characteristics of
the neighborhoods where respondents grew up and thus allows for additional information
on housing price determinants to be brought to bear on the estimation. Alternatively,
regression discontinuity designs, like that employed by Black (1999), can also be helpful,
precisely because they allow for exogenous instruments.
Conceptually related is Bayer and Ross (2009) who use structural features of sorting
mechanisms, as analyzed by the Epple et al. class of models and discussed in detail in section
5.2 below. By choosing where to live, individuals may be motivated not only about attributes
of houses and general neighborhood amenities, but also speci¯cally how their labor market
outcomes and therefore income prospects would be a®ected. This choice makes labor market
outcomes depend on individual and neighborhood observable and unobservable variables.
These authors exploit the monotonic relationship between neighborhood housing prices and
neighborhood quality as an empirical control function for the neighborhood unobservable in
the determination of labor market outcomes. This device in e®ect transforms the problem to
a model with one unobservable so that traditional instrumental variables solutions may be
applied. Mechanically speaking, this approach is quite similar to controlling for self-selection
bias associated with neighborhood choice, as in the Nesheim model and its generalization in
Section 2.6 above. Bayer and Ross instrument for each individuals observed neighborhood
attributes with the average neighborhood attributes of a set of observationally identical
individuals, which they obtain by conditioning with respect to a variety of controls available
in the data.
They estimate a model of labor market outcomes as a function of neighborhood e®ects
31using con¯dential micro data from the 1990 Decennial Census for the Boston MSA. The
outcomes used include: labor force participation, weeks worked and weekly hours in the
previous year. The results imply that the direct e®ects of geographic proximity to jobs,
neighborhood poverty rates, and average neighborhood education are substantially larger
than the conditional correlations identi¯ed using OLS, although the net e®ect of neighbor-
hood quality on labor market outcomes remains small. This suggests that individuals with
a lower likelihood of obtaining employment have sorted into locations with superior labor
market opportunities potentially to compensate for their poor unobservables.
Speci¯cally, the authors ¯nd that neighborhoods have large and complex e®ects on labor
market outcomes. Employment access, low levels of poverty, a low fraction of college grad-
uates, and high levels of unobserved neighborhood attributes are all associated with higher
levels of labor force participation, greater number of weeks worked in a year, and with the
exception of poverty greater average number of hours worked per week. For example, a one
standard deviation increase in employment access leads to approximately a four percentage
point increase in labor force participation in the sub-sample of individuals who have never
attended college. The positive impact of good job access on the intensity of labor force
participation, as captured by weeks per year and hours per week, does not change as the
human capital level of the sample falls. The e®ects regarding gender are even more strik-
ing all ¯ndings decline in magnitude and many become statistically insigni¯cant as married
women and eventually all women are deleted from the sample. Overall, the results indicate
that neighborhood e®ects are most important for individuals with weak attachment to the
labor market, especially married women. Still, while the e®ect of individual variables ap-
pears large, the net e®ect of neighborhood quality is small. Neighborhoods with low poverty
rates and other attributes that positively impact labor market outcomes appear correlated
with the percent of college graduates in equilibrium. These competing e®ects lead to small
and sometimes negative relationships between overall neighborhood quality and various la-
bor market outcomes. This is consistent with ¯ndings in research based on data from the
Moving to Opportunity program that improvements in neighborhoods quality had little or
no impact on earnings.
323 Endogenous Neighborhood and Contextual E®ects
in Housing Markets
In the context of housing and other decisions, close physical and \mental" proximity is likely
to be associated with individuals' caring about the actual or expected behavior of their
neighbors. These are individuals' decisions and thus by de¯nition they generate endogenous
social e®ects. Because of sorting into neighborhoods, neighbors' characteristics are likely
to be correlated. Results by Kiel and Zabel (2008) con¯rm this intuition using data from
the national sample of the American Housing Survey (NAHS).6 The correlation coe±cient
between nonwhite household head and the percentage of nonwhite heads in the immediate
neighborhood and in the census tract is 0.749 and 0.677, respectively, and for the percentage
of nonwhite heads between immediate neighborhood and tract 0.885. Similarly, the corre-
sponding estimates for share with completed high school are 0.331, 0.276, and 0.591, and for
permanent income 0.648, 0.451, and 0.607, respectively.
In order to understand better such outcomes, we augment individuals' utility functions
in the following fashion. Individual i is assumed to care about housing services indirectly
produced by a vector of characteristics of her dwelling unit h, such as size, number of rooms,
number of baths, age, etc., which are to be denoted by xh and referred to as dwelling at-
tributes, and by attributes x`(h) of the neighborhood, which includes location within an urban
area, typically identi¯ed via the census tract ` or the community (governmental jurisdiction)
in which it is located, to be referred to as neighborhood attributes. These may include sum-
mary statistics for the xh's of dwelling units belonging to neighborhood ` and, in addition,
housing quality attributes of the surrounding neighborhood itself that is comprised of im-
mediate neighbors, etc., to be denoted by k; as well as other characteristics of a tract, g`:
6The micro data from the American Housing Survey were geocoded by means of privileged access to
con¯dential US Census data. The main data source used for this study is the neighborhood clusters subsample
of the national sample of the American Housing Survey (NAHS). The NAHS is an unbalanced panel of more
than 50,000 housing units that are interviewed every two years and contains detailed information on dwelling
units and their occupants through time, including the current owner's evaluation of the unit's market value.
This data set is also used by Ioannides and Zabel (2008) and is discussed further below.
33In addition, individual i is assumed to care about observable and unobservable demographic
characteristics zk(i); among individual i's immediate neighbors in k; or in `(i); the census
tract where she resides. These are referred to as contextual (or exogenous social) e®ects
in the remainder of the chapter. Individual i is also assumed to care about the vector of
housing consumptions in her immediate neighborhood, Yk(i): This feature will be referred
to as endogenous social e®ect. A utility function V`ki is speci¯ed as:
V`ki = U(ci;(xh;xk;g`);zi;Yk(i);zk(i)): (24)
We assume that each of the vectors of dwelling and of neighborhood attributes may
be partitioned into two sub-vectors, with the ¯rst corresponding to size (scale) related at-
tributes and the second to potentially scale free ones (like ambience, reputation, etc.) that





; the vectors of dwelling unit h and neighborhood attributes of
its location, `(h); respectively. It is appropriate to think of such a scalar measure of housing
services as an index, and I return to such an interpretation further below.
Appealing to a theorem of Samuelson and Swamy (1974) on consistent aggregation [ see
also Sieg et al. (2002)] we posit that the size-related attributes of dwelling units enter
preferences through a separable function for housing services Y(¢); that is homogeneous of









`(h); 0 < # < 1; (25)
where inputs (xstru(h);x`(h)) are scalar, for simplicity, and # a parameter. The corresponding
sub-expenditure function for housing can be de¯ned as the minimum cost necessary to obtain





7We note, however, that the linear homogeneity restriction of housing services (26) is arbitrary in the
context of the Ekeland et al. (2004) hedonic theory and of Nesheim (2002), discussed above. Yet, it is
suggested by the Samuelson and Swamy, op. cit., requirements for consistent aggregation that imply an
invariant price index. It may be treated as an overidentifying restriction that can be tested by means of
techniques similar to measures of rank violations that are used in comparing di®erent types of indices that
Epple, Sieg and their co-authors themselves employ.
34That is:






`(h) ¢ Yh: (26)
A de¯nition of a price index for housing services from a dwelling unit in ` readily follows:







By using (25) in (26) and taking logs of both sides of (26) above yields a regression-like
equation
`nEY = `nP` + (1 ¡ #)`nxstru(h) + #x`(h):
Suppose that for a sample of dwelling units in di®erent locations (communities) housing
expenditure EY and xstru(h) are observable but not x`(h): Sieg et al. (2002) argue that
community-speci¯c housing prices P` are identi¯ed (up to scale) by the tract- or community-
speci¯c ¯xed e®ects in the regression model. More generally, Xstru(h) can be a vector of
observable housing characteristics, instead of the scalar xstru(h) above, and all unobservable
attributes are included in the error. This de¯nition may be used to express the quantity
of housing services (an inherently unobservable quantity)8 as a function of the observable
housing expenditure EY and of the components of the price index, which may be estimated.9
8This feature of housing as a commodity is well known, of course, and numerous approaches have aimed
at circumventing it. The ¯rst systematic one, however, is Epple, Gordon and Sieg (2009), which estimates
housing production functions when both housing quantities and prices are treated as unobserved latent
variables. The approach rests on duality theory and demonstrates the value of housing per unit of land and
the price of land in order to obtain an alternative representation of the indirect pro¯t function as a function
of those observables. The empirical demonstration of their approach uses data from recently built properties
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. An estimated Cobb-Douglas production function has a land share of
0:144 and thus a share of 0:856 for non-land mobile factors.
9However, the above de¯nition is appropriate when both components are freely variable. Once a com-
ponent has been ¯xed, the appropriate expenditure function is the quasi-¯xed one, and thus di®erent from
(26).
353.1 An Application: The Ioannides and Zabel Model of Neigh-
borhood Choice and Housing Demand as a Joint Decision
Ioannides and Zabel (2008) develop a model of housing structure demand with neighbor-
hood e®ects and of neighborhood choice as a joint decision. The estimation exploits a
household-level data set that has been augmented with contextual information at several
levels (\scales") of aggregation. One is at the neighborhood level, consisting of about ten
immediate neighbors, using data from the neighborhood clusters sub-sample of the American
Housing Survey. Another level is the census tract to which these dwelling units belong.10 A
third one is the metropolitan area in which the respective census tracts lie.
3.1.1 The Preference Structure
We follow Ioannides and Zabel (2008) and assume household i chooses among dwelling units
that belong to neighborhood cluster k; k = 1;:::;Ks; in tract `; ` = 1;:::;L; in a given
metropolitan area, and specify the utility function ­`ki; as a variation of (24) to be made up
of two multiplicative components. The ¯rst component, V`ki; is a conditional indirect utility
function, that is speci¯ed below as a function of prices, income, and additional observable
and unobservable characteristics of individuals residing in neighborhood cluster k and in the
census tract ` in which k lies. The second, ²`ki; is a random component of utility, drawn
from a distribution to be speci¯ed below, that a®ects neighborhood choice and is assumed to
be observable by the individual and unobservable by the econometrician.11 We specify the
conditional indirect utility function as being made up of a component re°ecting tract-speci¯c
characteristics, g`; and of a component re°ecting the value to household i from non-housing
consumption and consumption of housing services, !`ki; exp[³ig`] ¢ !`ki: That is:
­`ki = V`ki ¢ exp[²`ki] = exp[³ig`] ¢ !`ki ¢ exp[²`ki]: (28)
10These authors de¯ne neighborhood selection as discrete choice over census tracts. Public Census data
provide information on the joint distribution of various variables within tracts, which is crucial for the
estimation by Ioannides and Zabel and by Epple and co-authors, which we discuss in section 5.1 below.
11This model is in°uenced by features of Dubin and McFadden (1984) and of Epple, Romer and Sieg
(2001).
36The term !`ki is de¯ned as the maximum value of a direct utility function with respect to
nonhousing consumption, ci; and consumption of housing services, Yi; subject to a budget

































Bki(Yk;Zk) = exp[¹ ® + »zi + ¯E [By (Yk)] + °E [Bz (Zk)] + Àk + ´i]; (30)
y = `nY; ± > 0; ¹ < 0; Yk and Zk denote the vectors of individual i's neighbors' demand and
of their demographic characteristics in cluster k; E [By (Zk)] and E [Bz (Zk)] denote scalar
functions of neighbors' demand and of characteristics, respectively, with expectations being
taken conditional on k; and preference parameters ³i; ¹ ®;»;¯;° are unrestricted. The demand
for housing services follows from (29) by Roy's identity. After taking logs:
y`ki = ¹P` + ±Ii + ¹ ® + »zi + ¯E [By (Yk)] + °E [Bz (Zk)] + Àk + ´i:
I note that the slopes of the \indirect indi®erence curves" in (g`;P`) space (assuming












are positive and increasing in price (given that ¹ < 0) and in the parameter ³i; that evalu-
ates the tract-speci¯c attributes g`: Therefore, other things being equal, tracts with better
amenities are more attractive.12 The term Àk on the right hand side of (30) denotes an
idiosyncratic characteristic of neighborhood cluster k; a random variable that is assumed to
be independent and identically distributed across neighborhood clusters within each census
tract. It is assumed to be unobservable to households when tract and cluster choices are
made, but its value is revealed once households have chosen a particular cluster k: It is
12This model is not designed to sustain equilibrium community formation, unlike Epple and Sieg (1999)
and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001). Therefore, it is not a drawback that it does not satisfy the single-
crossing property with respect to income. This could, of course, be accommodated, but would make the
error structure less transparent.
37thus common among all households that reside in the same cluster. The term ´i is a ran-
dom household taste parameter, that is observable by individual i but unobservable by the
analyst; it is assumed to be independently and identically distributed over all individuals.
The model yields, see below, that random variables (Àk;´i); which are unobservable by the
analyst, make up the error component of the housing demand equation, with Àk being a
cluster-speci¯c random e®ect in housing demand, and ´i an i.i.d. stochastic shock.
Note that the tract-speci¯c term ³ig` in (28) can be speci¯ed to include tract characteris-
tics interacted with individual characteristics. In this fashion, households with children may
assign a di®erent weight on school quality than a household with no children, or households
might value the presence of neighbors of the same ethnic background or race di®erently that
those from other ethnic backgrounds or races.
Housing price P`; according to (27) an index that is homogeneous of degree one with
respect to its components, is constructed as follows. The neighborhood amenities component
P`;nei; which does vary over tracts ` within each metropolitan area, is standardized relative
to an overall mean for the entire economy. The price per unit of housing services component
Pstru; that is associated with a dwelling's structure and does not vary across tracts within
a metropolitan area (which can be justi¯ed by the assumption that the market for housing
construction materials is competitive at the level of the metropolitan area), is standardized
relative to an MSA-speci¯c intercept. The price index P` expresses a key characteristic
of housing markets, in that both components of the good \housing services" are bundled
together.
Consistently with the price index, we de¯ne housing consumption to be the continuous
°ow of services that comes from the dwelling structure and neighborhood amenities. Empir-
ically, dwelling structure is measured in terms of characteristics such as a dwelling's age, its
number of bedrooms and baths, the availability of a garage and various structural quality
features. Neighborhood amenities are proxied by the socioeconomic characteristics in the
tract where a dwelling unit lies. Housing expenditure re°ects both components of housing
demand relative to non-housing consumption.
The demand for housing structure, ystru;`;k;i; conditional on neighborhood choice, follows
38from the conditional utility function V`ki using Roy's identity13 with respect to price P`;stru:
After taking logarithms, this yields:
ystru;`ki = ®+#p`;nei+[¹(1¡#)¡#]pstru+±`nIi+»zi+¯E [By (ystru;k)]+°E [Bz (zk)]+Àk+´i;
(31)
with ® ´ ¹ ® + `n(1 ¡ #); a parameter, lower case p's indicating the natural logarithm of the
respective price variable, e.g. p`;nei = `nP`;nei; p`;stru = `nP`;stru: and (p`;stru;p`;nei):
Again, invoking the terminology of Manski (1993), we refer to the term By (yk) on the
right hand side of equation (31) as an endogenous social e®ect: a person's behavior depends
on the actual behavior of her neighbors. I refer to the term Bz (zk) as a contextual e®ect,
a social e®ect which re°ects taste over the characteristics of one's neighbors such as their
race, ethnicity, and income. The unobserved stochastic components on the right-hand-side
of equation (31) may re°ect a conditional version of what Manski calls a correlated e®ect:
similar individuals are likely to make similar choices of dwelling units and neighborhoods
and therefore have unobserved characteristics in common.
The logic of the endogenous social e®ect (a \keeping up with the Joneses" e®ect here)
suggests an equation like (31) for each of the members of neighborhood cluster k: Thus,
solving them simultaneously allows the analyst to obtain an instrument for ByYk; the en-
dogenous social e®ect on the right-hand-side of equation (31). This has implications for
identi¯cation, to which we return in detail in Section 3.2 below.
3.1.2 Neighborhood Choice
We assume that households limit their search to the metropolitan area in which they are
observed to live. The probability that household i choose tract `i; from among tracts ` =
1;:::;L; and neighborhood cluster ki; from among clusters k = 1;:::;K`; is given by the
13We are aware of an inconsistency here. This step requires that Roy's identity be taken with respect to a
suitably restricted indirect utility function, where the appropriate neighborhood-speci¯c components of the
consumption bundle are held ¯xed, once neighborhood is chosen. However, this particular approach is not
structural, in the econometric sense, and designed to highlight the complexities of housing as a joint discrete
and continuous decision.
39probability that the (logarithm of) actual utility from this choice exceeds the utilities from
all other choices:
Prob`ikii = Probf`n!`ikii ¡ `n!`ki + (³ig`i ¡ ³ig`) ¸ ¡(²`ikii ¡ ²`ki); 8(`;k) 6= (`i;ki)g:
(32)
This can be computed, once the stochastic structure in equation (29) has been speci¯ed.
It follows from equation (32) that when comparing utility between any two tracts the term
I1¡±
i ¡1
1¡± cancels out. However, income and other individual characteristics are still present
through the speci¯cation of ³ig`; the household-speci¯c terms interacted with tract char-








; introduced in equation (29) above. In view of
the de¯nition of Bki in (30) above, when comparing utilities across tracts, households are
assumed to take expectations with respect to Àk; which is assumed to be independent of
other variables and unobservable at that point in the choice process. Therefore, the choice
probabilities (32) are expressed as the probabilities of the events:
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where ~ Bki = exp[¹ ® + »zi + ¯E [By (Yk)] + °E [Bz (zk)]]:
Condition (33) has the intuitively appealing implication that the larger the value of the
unobserved taste parameter ´i (the i.i.d. shock in the demand equation (31)), that is, the
larger the dwelling a household wants given all observables, the smaller the neighborhood
price it wishes to pay. Therefore, variation of price across tracts, as expressed by component
P` in the composite price index (27), is a key element of the interaction between the discrete
choice of neighborhood and the continuous choice of housing structure.14
Under the assumption that the ²`ki's in equations (32) and (33) are independently and
identically extreme-value distributed across all census tracts in an MSA and in all neighbor-
hood clusters within them, the choice probabilities are given by the multinomial logit model










There is a well-known drawback to applying the MNL model, in that it stretches the
plausibility of the stochastic structure, as the ²`ki's are unlikely to be independent across
alternative residential choices. In particular, evaluating alternative clusters within the same
census tract will involve common tract-level unobservables that will cause the error terms
to be correlated. One can fully account for this possibility via a nested logit model or more
general models. 15
In view of lack of information about which neighborhoods (either at the cluster- or
tract-level) households considered before they choose to locate where they are observed,
Ioannides and Zabel assume individuals choose over Census tracts. They utilize a suggestion
of McFadden (1978)16, that the discrete choice model may be estimated by generating a
random sample of alternatives from the full choice set, which may be unobserved.17
For each dwelling unit observed in the cluster subsample of the public NAHS data Ioan-
nides and Zabel identify, by relying on con¯dential U.S. Census data, the Census tract in
which it lies and choose randomly ten other tracts from among the universe of tracts in the
15The expected value of the maximum utility associated with the neighborhood choice problem (32), when

























¡²N]: See Ioannides (2010), Chapter 3, Appendix B, for more details.
16See Blackley and Ondrich [3] and Quigley [25] for two exceptions, and Fox (2007) for a modernization of
McFadden's procedure. Bierlaire et al. (2003) shows that the consistency of estimation when using a subset
of the opportunity set extends to all random utility models where the errors obey a GEV distribution.
17This estimation is consistent, provided that: one, independence from irrelevant alternatives holds; and
two, if an alternative is included in the assigned set, then it has the logical possibility of being an observed
choice from that set. The ¯rst condition is ensured by their use of the MNL; the second is satis¯ed because
random selection satis¯es the \uniform conditioning property" of McFadden, op. cit., 88{89. See also Fox
(2007).
41respective metropolitan area. They approximate the expressions in the choice probabilities
above by using as regressors tract-level characteristics, on their own and also interacted with
individual characteristics. They also include individual variables interacted with statistics
of the joint distributions of tract-level variables to proxy for the inclusive value, an auxiliary
function that is included in the second stage of the nested logit model and which captures
the heterogeneity of clusters within the tract. See Ioannides and Zabel, op. cit., Appendix
A. Their approach falls short of a full structural estimation of the discrete choice model,
but does allow the data to determine which particular statistics, say from among di®erent
statistics interacted with individual characteristics, best explain the observed choices.
3.2 Housing Demand with Neighborhood E®ects
The conditional demand for housing structure equation by individual i in metropolitan area










+Àk +E[´ij` = `i]+Ãi;
(36)
where #0 ´ ¹(1¡#)¡#; a parameter, and k(i) denotes the neighborhood cluster of individual
i: Note that the endogenous and contextual e®ects have been speci¯ed as the means of the










The conditional mean correction in equation (36), E[´ij` = `i]; accounts for the fact that
the error term on the right-hand-side of the demand equation (31) is likely to be correlated
with the other regressors in the model. This correction term can be estimated using the
results from the neighborhood choice equation (34) in the standard fashion for sample selec-
tion bias. 18 While inclusion of the components of the price index (pm;stru;pm;`;nei); readily
follows from the model, allowing unconstrained estimation of their coe±cients may deter-
18The speci¯c form of the sample selection bias correction terms are computed using the results in Dubin
and McFadden (1984). The correction requires eleven terms, one for each of the eleven census tracts in the
neighborhood choice model. See Ioannides and Zabel (2008), Appendix B, for details.
42mine whether neighborhood demand is a substitute or a complement to housing structure
demand.
The mean of the neighbors' housing demand is correlated with the error term in equation
(36) since it includes the unobserved cluster e®ect, Àk: In order to identify the model, given
the reduced form, one needs an instrument, a variable whose neighborhood average is not
included in the causal model (e.g., is not a contextual e®ect). As shown by Brock and Durlauf
(2001), the selection correction terms are valid instruments. In particular, the neighborhood
averages of these terms emerge naturally, from solving endogenously for the expectations of
neighbors' demands, as valid instruments.
Identi¯cation is an issue even in the absence of social interactions. In order to identify
the housing demand model that is conditional on residential choice, the selection correction
terms, (making up E[´ij` = `i]), must not be collinear with the other regressors in equation
(36). One way of achieving identi¯cation is by ensuring that one or more variables in the
neighborhood choice model be excluded from the housing structure demand equation. Given
that we are modeling housing structure demand, there are variables that a®ect neighborhood
choice and not structure demand and thus qualify. Thus, the housing structure demand
equation is identi¯ed via these exclusion restrictions.





; rests on solving the housing structure demand equations (in expectation)




: Thus, the cluster
means of the sample selection terms, E[´ij` = `i]; arise naturally as identifying instruments:
E[ystru;k(i)] = ¼0 + ¼1pmki;nei + ¼2pm;stru + ¼2E[zk(i)] + ¼3E[´hjs = sh] + ´k(i); (37)
where ´k(i) is the unobserved error term and the neighbors' mean income Ik(i) is included in
E[zk(i)] for brevity.
The eleven sample selection bias correction terms vary within the cluster, as they de-
pend on individual variables via the interaction terms in the neighborhood choice model.19
19This feature addresses the critique of Angrist and Pischke (2009) of speci¯cation of peer e®ects, section
4.6.2, p. 192{197, in that the equation accounts for variation in ex ante peer characteristics that predate the
43They are, therefore, key to the identi¯cation of the endogenous neighborhood e®ect. Intu-
itively, one's neighbors' selection bias correction terms are excluded from one's own demand
for housing structure equation because one's neighbors' tastes for housing (in contrast to
their observed characteristics) do not directly a®ect one's own demand for housing. These
preferences do have an indirect e®ect, though, through the endogenous neighborhood e®ect.
3.3 Estimation of Neighborhood Choice and Housing Structure
Demand with Neighborhood E®ects
Ioannides and Zabel (2008) construct measures for housing price and quantity, both quan-
tities that are not are directly observable. They decompose continuous housing demand
into two components; structure demand and neighborhood demand. They model the former
component in terms of a continuous scalar quantity that represents the °ow of housing ser-
vices. The price of housing is thus the price for a unit of services from housing structure.
Neighborhood demand may be either a substitute or a complement to housing structure,
and including the neighborhood price in the demand for structure equation allows for the
data to resolve the issue.
Ioannides and Zabel estimate an ad hoc hedonic house price function, Pm`ht; for a dwelling
unit h as a function of its structural characteristics xm`ht; location in MSA m; and in census
track ` with characteristics gm`t; using the non-cluster NAHS data at time t: The use of
these data has two advantages. One is that they make up approximately ninety per cent of
the NAHS data thus a®ording them a much larger data set than the neighborhood clusters
subsample of the NAHS. Second, the prices thus obtained come from a di®erent data set than
the one used to estimate the housing structure demand equation. Hence, they use the tract
characteristics to proxy for all levels of neighborhood quality and, in particular, of the con-
sumption of housing structure by a unit's neighbors and their socioeconomic characteristics,
(Yk(i);zk(i)):
outcome variable, as in the determinants of neighborhood choice.




a0mtMSAm;h;t + a1xm;`;h;t + a2gm;`;t + um;`;h;t; (38)
where h indexes dwelling units, i = 1;:::;Nm; ` = 1;:::;Lm; census tracks in MSA m; and
m = 1;:::;M MSAs for each of the same three waves of the NAHS data for which data on
clusters are also available, t = 1985; 1989; 1993; MSAmht is dummy variable equal to 1, if
unit h is in metro area m in period t; and equal to 0, otherwise. Based on (38), Zabel (2004)
de¯nes a price index for the average (structure) quality dwelling unit in tract ` in MSA m
and wave t as:
Pm;`;t =
exp(^ a0mt + ^ a1x + ^ a2gm`t)
exp(^ a011 + ^ a1x + ^ a2 g)
; (39)
where the index is relative to MSA = 1 in time period 1 (Denver in 1985), and q and g are
evaluated at ¯xed mean values, ¹ x and ¹ g; respectively. Note that p111 = 1: This price index
is decomposed into:
Pm;`;t =
exp(^ a0mt + ^ a1x)




= Pmt;stru ¢ Pm`t;nei; (40)
where Pm;t;stru; the component of price that corresponds to structure and is invariant within
MSA m; and Pm;`;t;nei that corresponds to neighborhood (tract) `: The neighborhood price
varies across census tracts. The prices will be referred to in logs, p = `nP:
Housing structure services for an individual i living in unit h(i) are de¯ned, in logs, as
ym`ki;stru = `nr + ^ a0mt + ^ a1xm`ht ¡ pmt;stru: (41)
Once the hedonic equation (38) is estimated, the demand for structure, according to equation
(41), and the structure and neighborhood prices pmt;stru, pm`t;nei according to equation (40),
can be computed.
3.3.1 Estimation of Neighborhood Choice
Ioannides and Zabel estimate the model of neighborhood choice according to Equ. (34). The
structural characteristics of dwelling unit m`ht; xm`ht; include the age of the unit and its
square, the number of full baths, of bedrooms, and of total rooms, whether or not there is a
45garage and a number of additional structural quality variables (such as whether the enumer-
ator saw cracks on walls and ceilings, broken pipes, etc.). The neighborhood characteristics
of tract m`ht; gm`t; include a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the unit lies
in the central city of the MSA, the property tax rate, and tract-level variables that include
median household income, the percent over 25 years of age who graduated from high school,
and the percent of the tract population that is nonwhite.
A benchmark model that contains only tract-speci¯c characteristics of individuals and
dwellings in the tract of current residence shows that higher price, median age of dwellings,
median number of bedrooms, the fractions of owners and nonwhites in the tract and the
fractions of residents in the tract with a high school degree and commuting less than twenty
minutes all increase the likelihood of choosing a tract. On the other hand, a higher median
income, median rent, median age of tract residents, vacancy rate, poverty rate, and unem-
ployment rate decrease the likelihood of choosing a tract. The fraction moved in within the
last 5 years is not signi¯cant. This regression has a pseudo-R2 of 0.0736. The results show
that the valuation of median tract income is increasing in individual income and that the
valuation of vacancy rates declines with income though it increases in an absolute sense.
On the other hand while individuals positively value homeownership rates, this valuation
declines with income.
Interacting the tract-level race variables with the individual race variables shows that
an increase in the percent nonwhite will decrease the likelihood of tract choice but there is
no additional e®ect if there is at least ¯fty percent nonwhites in the tract (this is measured
through the variable dominant race). For nonwhites, an increase in the percent nonwhite
will increase the likelihood of tract choice. There is an additional positive e®ect if there is
at least ¯fty percent nonwhites in the tract.
Interacting discrete indicators for individual education, that is, for those without a high
school degree, with at most a high school degree, and with a college degree, with the fraction
of individuals over twenty ¯ve years old in the tract who have a high school degree shows
a strong positive relationship between individual and tract education; an increase in the
fraction in the tract with a high school degree will decrease the probability of residing in
46the tract for individuals with no high school degree and will increase this probability for
those with a college degree. Similarly, results with the median age shows that increasing the
median age makes those in the ¯rst quartile of the age distribution less likely to choose the
tract compared to older individuals. It also makes married household heads less attracted
by the tract. When a full complement of 74 explanatory variables are included, the pseudo-
R2 rises to 0.1628, and the additional variables included compared to those in the model
reported in column 3 of Table 4 are jointly statistically signi¯cant.
3.3.2 Estimation of Housing Structure Demand with Neighborhood E®ects
Table 5, ibid., reports the estimation results for the housing structure demand equation (36),
measured in logs. The regressors include the logs of the structure and neighborhood prices,
and in addition the log of income, the number of persons in the household, and dummy
variables that indicate if the owner has graduated from high school, is married, is white, and
moved in the last ¯ve years as individual variables and their cluster averages as contextual
e®ects, and the endogenous social e®ect.
When the eleven sample selection bias correction terms are included, they are statisti-
cally signi¯cant as a group at the 1% level. The estimated price elasticities for structure
and neighborhood, respectively, are ¡0:1784 and 0:2086: The signs suggest that structure
and neighborhood quality are substitutes. The permanent income elasticity is positive and
signi¯cant; 0.2106. Household size has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on the demand for
housing structure. The instrumental variable estimates of demand for structure show that
the structure price elasticity is now much smaller than when the neighborhood e®ects were
not included (and not signi¯cant). The neighborhood price elasticity is now negative, small
in magnitude, but only marginally signi¯cant. Clearly, the neighborhood price is positively
correlated with the neighborhood e®ects and hence there is a positive bias when the latter
are excluded from the demand equation. The negative coe±cient for the neighborhood price
indicates that structure and neighborhood are complements. The income elasticity is also
much smaller in magnitude, though it is still positive and signi¯cant. The coe±cient estimate
for the mean of the neighbors' structure demand, the endogenous social e®ect, is 0.8504. The
47contextual e®ects are not jointly signi¯cant and only one variable is individually marginally
signi¯cant; the mean of neighbors' household size (p¡value = 0.048). The sample selection
bias correction terms are marginally signi¯cant as a group (p¡value = 0.041). These terms
are more signi¯cant in the regressions without neighborhood e®ects. This is also true for
the price and income elasticities. Clearly, these terms are picking up some of the omitted
neighborhood e®ects.
Overall, the estimates of the housing structure demand therefore do con¯rm that en-
dogenous neighborhood e®ects are important and are in fact strengthened when neighbor-
hood choice is accounted for. Further, the own-price elasticity nearly doubles in magnitude
(-0.1319 versus -0.0772) but remains insigni¯cant. It is also true, however, that the unob-
servable e®ect for individuals in the same neighborhood is an important part of the story,
even after neighborhood choice has been accounted for.
3.4 Neighborhood Information in Hedonic Regressions
In view of these empirical results, we can re°ect on the results of Kiel and Zabel (2008),
who use the same data as Ioannides and Zabel (2008), and discuss empirical hedonic results
with social e®ects. These authors estimate housing hedonics with neighborhood information
that correspond neatly to the Ioannides and Zabel model and empirical approach. They
estimate a hedonic function ¦(xh;xk;g`;zk;z`(k)); whose arguments are attributes of the
dwelling, cluster, tract, xh; xk; g`; and contextual e®ects associated with the occupants of
the dwelling units in the cluster and tract of unit h; zk;z`(k); while accounting for a base MSA-
speci¯c price. Their results are obtained with cluster random e®ects and robust standard
errors and generally con¯rm the notion that cluster, tract and MSA variables (\location,
location, location," 3L's in their words) are all highly signi¯cant in the house price hedonic.
When the attributes of these di®erent aspects of location are alternatively excluded from the
regression, the percent increase in the standard error are quite similar: 2.2%, 2.3%, and 2.7%,
respectively. This indicates that each of the 3Ls have a similar importance in determining
house prices. Kiel and Zabel report on results when data on clusters are excluded, which are
48after all a very special feature of the NAHS. Doing so does not a®ect much the estimates for
the coe±cients of dwelling attributes, nor for those for the census tract attributes. Yet, it is
particularly noteworthy that the coe±cient of the MSA-speci¯c price increases from 0.677 to
1.022. This indicates that the cluster variables are important in housing values and relevant
for the construction of house indices.
These results also suggest that the concept of neighborhood is multifaceted. Individuals
indeed care about the quality of neighborhoods at several levels (\scales"). The information
at the levels of cluster, tract and MSA can be highly correlated, but Kiel and Zabel suggest
that there is also independent information at those di®erent levels that appears to have
signi¯cant impact on the willingness to pay for a house in a given location. This accords with
the notion that di®erent small neighborhoods have di®erent character, and their proximity
to one another confer character to higher-level neighborhoods that contain them.
Finally, while the use of the hedonic price function here is empirically well grounded,
recalling the generalization of the Nesheim model in section 2.6 suggests that the hedonic
estimation itself also contributes to estimation of structural parameters. This is the import
of the Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2004) critique of standard hedonic estimations.
Ioannides (2010), Chapter 3, Appendix C, proposes a conceptual extension of the modern
hedonic approach of Ekeland et al. to housing in the presence of contextual and endogenous
neighborhood e®ects and brie°y discusses the pitfalls of misspeci¯cation. The multitude of
demands imposed on the existence of hedonic price functions make it di±cult to obtain in
closed form hedonic price functions for arbitrary preferences. Nonetheless, as we discussed in
section 2.8 above, Bayer and Ross, op. cit., demonstrate a notable use of the monotonic but
highly nonlinear relationship between neighborhood housing price and neighborhood quality
as an empirical control function for neighborhood unobservables.
494 Neighborhood E®ects and the Geometry of the Canon-
ical Urban Model
Di®erent communities di®er in terms of density of settlement, quality of amenities and of
public services, distance to employment centers and to transportation systems. Variations
also exist within di®erent parts of larger communities. Such di®erences are important in de-
termining the fabric of large cities and metropolitan areas more generally. When individuals
choose where to live, they take into consideration many such attributes of neighborhoods
in addition to speci¯c features of the dwelling units that they choose to live in. Unlike the
models developed above, here we impose a speci¯c geometry. Individuals commute to a
central business district (CBD) in order to work and/or socialize.
We assume that the typical individual derives utility from consuming housing in quantity
h(`) and a composite non-housing good, c(`); when located in location `; indicated by the
distance from a city's predetermined central business district (CBD) along a line.20 The
canonical urban model implies stark income or preference segregation. This property of
the model provides a natural benchmark against which to gauge the impact of neighborhood
e®ects. We consider neighborhood e®ects indirectly through the impact on location decisions
of individuals of exogenous and endogenous amenities. In particular, exogenous amenities
valued by individuals may cause high-income individuals to live closer to, or further away
from, the CBD, depending upon the strength of these preferences. Such patterns must
not be necessarily attributed to high-income individuals' wanting to be near other high-
income individuals. Endogenous amenities valued by individuals, in the form of individuals'
valuing being near other individuals with particular characteristics, generate a richer set of
possibilities, including multiple equilibria. One could speculate, in view of the results of
Brock and Durlauf (2007) discussed in section 2.4 above, that pattern reversals that are
20While the notion of a circular city is arguably more realistically appealing, a number of results have
underscored that analytically there is no advantage to the circular con¯guration. In particular, as Ogawa
and Fujita (1980; 1989) show, non-monocentric urban con¯gurations in two-dimensional space (with circular
symmetry imposed) are qualitatively essentially the same as those in the one-dimensional space.
50due to multiple equilibria, may be used to identify presence of endogenous social e®ects in
location patterns at the city level. Brock and Durlauf demonstrate that under various shape
restrictions on the probability density of the unobservables, pattern reversals can only occur
because of multiple equilibria and hence endogenous social interactions. This idea has not
yet been utilized in urban research.
Below we start with a presentation of the canonical urban model, also known as Alonso{
Mills{Muth model. Next we use it to study the impact of amenities, ¯rst when their dis-
tribution over space is given exogenously and then when they are created by individuals'
location decisions. We then turn to examination of the impact of income and preference het-
erogeneity on location decisions. We show that across locationally de¯ned (that is, in terms
of distance from the CBD) neighborhoods, income and housing preferences are positively
correlated, but within neighborhoods, they are negatively correlated.
4.1 The Alonso { Mills { Muth Canonical Urban Model
Utility is denoted by ­(h(`);c(`)): Let R(`) denote the rental rate of land. In the simplest
possible case, we assume that housing consumption is simply consumption of services from
land. The respective budget constraint is:
c(`) + R(`)h(`) = I ¡ k(`); (42)
where I denotes income, k(`) transportation costs as a function of distance from the CBD,
and the price of the composite good is assumed to be invariant to distance from the CBD
and thus set equal to 1.
It is standard to start by considering the choice of (h;c); conditional on `; so as to




Demand for housing follows from the solution to this problem.
It is convenient in developing the locational equilibrium model to work also with the
dual representation of preferences. By solving for the optimal bundle (h¤(`);c¤(`)) and by
51substituting back into the utility function we obtain the indirect utility function,
O(R(`);I ¡ k(`)) ´ ­(h
¤(`);c
¤(`)):
By requiring invariance with respect to distance from the CBD, we obtain a condition that
the land rental rate must satisfy so as the typical individual be indi®erent across all locations.
That is, moving away from the CBD increases transportation costs and therefore land rent







By integrating (44) with respect to `; we get an expression for the equilibrium land rental
rate, which of course, contains a constant of integration. Equilibrium conditions, which we
take up in the next section below, determine the model fully. Condition (44) is known as
the Mills{Muth condition. The basic framework outlined so far combines features of Alonso
(1964), Mills (1967)and Muth (1969).
An alternative approach is to work with the bid rent function [Fujita (1989)], de¯ned as
the maximum land rental an individual is willing to pay, conditional on attaining a given




I ¡ k(`) ¡ c
h
j ­(h;c) = !
)
: (45)
It follows from this de¯nition of the expenditure function that its value when the land rental
rate is set equal to the bid rent function is equal to income net of transport costs. The bid
rent function is decreasing in distance from the CBD and in utility attained. That is, a
household can attain a higher utility level given income net of commuting costs only if land
rent is reduced. Fujita (1989), p. 22, proves that if the transport cost function is linear or
concave, the bid rent curves are strictly convex.
4.2 Locational Equilibrium for Individuals
Closing the model requires that we characterize equilibrium in the land market. Let land ex-
tend along a line away from the CBD. Expressing land supply equal land demand closes the
52model. Alternatively, we may assume that equilibrium utility is given from other opportuni-
ties in the economy. Setting equilibrium utility in the city be equal to what is exogenously
given determines the constant of integration.
An example clari¯es things. Let ­(h;c) ´ (1 ¡ ¯)`nc + ¯`nh; for which O = ¯`n¯ +
(1 ¡ ¯)`n(1 ¡ ¯) + `n(I ¡ k`) ¡ ¯`nR: This yields R(`) = R(0)(I ¡ k(`))
1
¯: If the supply of
land is given, then equating it with demand for land determines R(0): Alternatively, if the
opportunity cost of land is given, then by equating the land rental at the edge of the city to
it yields a condition that R(0) and the land size of the city, ¹ ` must satisfy. So, by equating
demand and supply of land all unknowns are determined. Finally, equating O from above
to exogenously given utility determines directly the land rental rate and therefore from the
condition for land equilibrium, the land size of the city. Equivalently, we may work with city
size in terms of population.
As another example, consider that housing (that is, land) consumption is ¯xed at the unit
level, so that for locational equilibrium, direct utility of consumption, ­(1;I ¡k(`)¡R(`));
be constant for all `: This yields a land rental rate that varies with ¡k(`); that is it declines
as distance from the CBD. We conclude that when distance from a given center is the sole
index of locational choice and determinant of the transportation cost, then the equilibrium
land rental fully re°ects all relevant parameters.
This approach allows us to characterize locational choice of heterogeneous households.
Given a land rental function, an individual locates so as to maximize utility, which occurs
where the bid rent function is tangent to the land rental function. Provided that preferences
are well behaved, transportation costs are increasing in the distance from the CBD and
the Marshallian demand for land is increasing in income, one can prove that given two
households that are otherwise identical, face the same transport cost function and di®er
in terms of incomes, then households with higher incomes locate further away from the
CBD than households with lower incomes [ Fujita (1989), 105{111 ]. With many household
types, j = 1;:::;J; equilibrium may be characterized easily provided that bid rent functions
corresponding to di®erent types may be ranked in decreasing order of steepness.
The group with the overall steepest bid rent curve locates nearest the center, and then
53one with the next steepest follows. These results with the equilibrium land rental function
being the upper envelope of the equilibrium locations of di®erent groups are clari¯ed in terms
of the boundary rent curve, ^ Rj(`): For every household type, this gives the rent at the edge
of a zone occupied by the particular group so that all individuals of that type have been
accommodated, given a particular utility level [ibid., p. 55]. Then, at equilibrium, the utility
level the group may enjoy is determined by the value of the boundary rent curve associated
with the next group. Locational equilibrium is determined recursively from the urban fringe.
Given the value of land in agriculture, RA; the boundary rent curve for the group occupying
the outermost area yields the size of the urban area and the associated utility is given by the
utility level that makes the bid rent curve at the respective location be equal to RA = ^ Rj(`J);
and ª(`J;u¤
J) = RA: Thereafter, ª(R¤
j;u¤
j) = ^ Rj(`j); j = 1;:::;J ¡ 1: In the special case
where households di®er with respect to income only, and I1 < ::: < IJ; then the steepness
of the bid rent curves varies inversely with income. As a result, concentric zones around the
CBD will be occupied by groups in increasing order of income.
When households di®er in terms of incomes, the system of land rentals that equilibrates
the housing market re°ects the entire distribution of incomes. Alternatively, given individ-
uals who di®er in terms of incomes, then the price system expresses how individuals in an
urban economy self-organize vis a vis location. Land rentals thus re°ect the socioeconomic
characteristics of the entire population of an urban area.
4.3 Amenities
A central feature of the urban location model as presented so far is that the CBD is assumed
to function as an amenity. The amenity role of the CBD provides an essential metric for the
value of distance from it. Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999) in an e®ort to analyze the
role of amenities as distinct from travel to the CBD introduce an additional argument of the
utility function, location-speci¯c amenities denoted by, a(`);
­ ´ ­(h(`);c(`);a(`)):
Amenities may be exogenous or endogenous, that is, they may be exogenous attributes of
54locations, or endogenous being de¯ned in terms of decisions that agents themselves make or
of characteristics of the agents who locate at di®erent locations. The de¯nition of the indirect
utility function is adapted in the obvious way: O(R(`);I ¡ k(`);a(`)) ´ ­(h¤(`);c¤(`);a(`)):










Even if the amenity has a positive e®ect on utility, O3 > 0; the amenity must improve with
distance from the CBD. Speci¯cally, a0(`) must be positive and su±ciently large for the land
gradient to remain negative.
If two groups of individuals who di®er only with respect to income, I1 < I2; compete
for land, then in the absence of the amenity e®ect, each group will locate in the area of the
city where it outbids the other group. Let ^ ` denote the threshold point, that is the location
where the land bid rent curve for the two groups become equal: R1(^ `) = R2(^ `): At the
threshold point, both group face the same price. So, the di®erence in housing consumption
is due to the di®erence in income net of transportation costs. It is reasonable to assume
that transportation costs are higher for the higher income group. So: h2(^ `) > h1(^ `): Under
the assumption that the unit cost of transportation depend on the opportunity cost of time,
then k1 < k2: The location of the two groups depends on the di®erence between the slopes
of the bid-rent curves at ^ `; R0
2(^ `) ¡ R0





























Ignoring for a moment the dependence of indirect utility on amenities, whether or not the
higher income group will occupy the land nearer the CBD depends on the di®erent e®ect
of income on the demand for housing: if housing demand rises less rapidly relative to unit






h1(^ `); the rich live near the CBD and
the poor in the suburbs; if, on the other hand, unit transportation costs rises less rapidly
relative to housing demand as income increases, k2
h2(^ `) < k1
h1(^ `); then the rich live in the
suburbs and the poor near the CBD. To obtain a prediction for land use in the presence of
the amenity, we need to assess how the term
O3(`)
h(`) varies with income. Brueckner et al. show
55that if the (constant) elasticity of substitution between non-housing consumption, housing
consumption and the services of the amenity is less than 1, then the above ratio increases
with income. If the amenity declines with distance from the CBD but its marginal e®ect
with distance is small, then the poor will live in the center and the rich in the suburbs. If, on
the other hand, the marginal e®ect with distance is negative but large in absolutely value,
then the amenity advantage of the center will draw the rich near the CBD and the poor to
the suburbs. So, increasing the amenity attractiveness of the CBD may reverse the location
pattern.
These results are critical in understanding the impact of income di®erences on land use
in the presence of neighborhood e®ects as a \centrifugal force," that is the attraction of
the CBD, even when it is endogenous. The amenity has so far been modeled as dispersed
according to a exogenous pattern. Nonetheless, its impact on the geometry of land use
is particularly useful in modeling the impact of correlated e®ects on urban land use at
equilibrium. That is, we may express a number of assumptions about preferences for housing
and the amenity, and their variation with distance from the CBD and explore their impact
on equilibrium land use.
Another use of the above model is to explore the impact of endogenizing the amenity.
We may assume that individuals di®er and de¯ne the amenity so as to be a function of the
characteristics of one's neighbors relative to one's one characteristic. Let income be such a
characteristic. If individuals prefer to live near others with similar incomes, then that would
be so wherever they might be. If a rich person were to move into a poor area, then her bid-
rent curve would be depressed because she would have to live near others who are not like
her. But, rich people moving together near the CBD may cause an increase of each other's
bid-rent curves and thus force a reversal of the location pattern. However, the endogenous
amenity e®ect must be su±ciently strong to accomplish this. We explore this in more detail
next.
564.3.1 Endogenous Amenity
As we saw, individuals' valuing just being near others de¯nes a metric that implies in turn a
density, or equivalently, a bid-rent curve. What if individuals di®er with respect to income,
an exogenous characteristic that is salient with respect to housing decisions? While income
is exogenous, where individuals locate at equilibrium is endogenous and plays the role of an
endogenous amenity of the type analyzed by Brueckner, et al, op. cit..
These authors simplify the problem by considering two types of dwellings only, ¹ h1 and
¹ h2; ¹ h2 > ¹ h1; with both being available in each location and with group 2, the rich, choosing
the larger size. They show that for the pattern 'rich in center' and 'poor in suburbs' to be
an equilibrium, the bid-rent by the poor, although steeper than those by the rich within the
either zone, must be entirely dominated by that of the rich in center. This is compatible with
a discontinuity at the boundary. Such discontinuity is of course an artifact of the endogenous
amenity's being insensitive to how far one is from the boundary. Such a discontinuity gives
rise to the possibility that a mixed city is an equilibrium outcome. That is, the bid-rent of
the rich, when the endogenous amenity is the mean neighborhood income, would have to
dominate that of the poor over the entire domain, so that a city may accommodate both
groups throughout. This condition is more stringent, in that the rich bid-rent would in this
case be below that of the rich alone case. However, the outcome is disadvantageous for the
poor, in that they would have to pay a higher rent than they would if they were to occupy
the center on their own. Such a disadvantageous desegregation is a new possibility within
the urban model and whose additional properties, including stability, need to be explored
further. See Brueckner et al. (1999) for full details.
4.4 Households with Heterogeneous Preferences
Critical to understanding the impact of neighborhood e®ects is to be able to compare with
equilibrium outcomes when individual di®er but there are no neighborhood e®ects. Individ-
uals may di®er in terms of preferences or income, or preferences may covary with incomes.
We examine in turn the impact of preference heterogeneity in the form of additive shocks
57to utility on location decisions of households and on equilibrium in the canonical model, in
terms of income, and ¯nally in terms of both preferences and income.
4.4.1 Preference Heterogeneity
We consider next taste heterogeneity in the form of random shocks to utility. Following the
approach of Anas (1990), let locations be de¯ned in terms of a denumerable number of thin
areas which are indexed by their distance from the CBD, ` = 0;`1;:::;`N¡1; with transport
costs being negligible within each location and being equal to k; per unit distance, across
locations. All individuals commute to the CBD. Let an individual i who considers locating
in location ` derive utility
~ ­i` = O(R(`);I ¡ k`) + $i`; ` = 0;1;:::;N ¡ 1; (48)
where the random variables $i` are independently and identically distributed across all
individuals and locations. Essentially, individuals are ex ante identical. However, individual
i; i 2 I; in evaluating each site ` draws from a distribution, which is the same for all sites, a
component that is unobservable to the analyst. Assuming that the distribution of the $i`'s is
extreme value of type II, with mean zero, variance ¼2
6%2 and mode ¡EC
% ; where EC = 0:5772;




`=0 exp[%O(R(`n);I ¡ k`n)]
; i = 0;1;:::;N ¡ 1: (49)
Taste heterogeneity is characterized concisely by parameter %; the larger this parameter, the
smaller the dispersion. With extreme taste heterogeneity, % = 0; variance is in¯nite and
choice is totally random and independent of utility evaluations: Prob`n = 1=N: With zero
taste heterogeneity, % ! 1; variance is zero, and only the measured component of utility
determines choice. That is, if O(R(`i);I ¡k`n) > max`6=`n O(R(`);I ¡k`); then Prob`n ! 1:
Returning to the general model, let all individuals have identical incomes and each site
have unit land area. Equilibrium may be de¯ned in terms of a land rental function, R(`);
and a boundary Ne < N ¡ 1; such that
R
e(`Ne) = Ra; R
e(`n) ¸ Ra;n < Ne; (50)
58where Ra denotes the exogenous rental land may earn in agricultural use at the city boundary,
and the expected demand for land (housing) in every site is equal to supply,
h
¤
`jIjProb` = 1; ` = 0;:::;Ne; (51)
where the probability P(`) that an individual would choose ` is given in (49). Mechanically,
equations (51) must be solved for all land rentals. Also, with the stochastic location model










The impact of heterogeneity may be examined in more detail if we specify the utility
function. E.g., if the utility function is logarithmic, ­(h;c) ´ (1 ¡ ¯)`nc + ¯`nh; then it










As % increases, uncertainty decreases, that is preferences become more homogeneous and the
exponent of the RHS increases, implying that the land rent gradient falls more sharply with
distance. In the case of % ! 1; the exponent in the RHS of (53) tends to 1
¯; and we are in
the Alonso{Mills{Muth case. In that case, utility is equalized across all locations. As the
variance of utility shocks decreases, preferences become more homogeneous, rents increase
within a certain distance from the CBD and decrease beyond that distance, this making the
urban structure more compact. One can think of preference heterogeneity as introducing
correlated e®ects. The more similar individuals are, the closer together they would locate.
This serves as a useful benchmark.
4.5 Income and Preference Heterogeneity
We assume that preferences are deterministic but individuals di®er in terms of both incomes
and taste across agents and imbed the problem in the simpli¯ed spatial setting of Anas
(1990), presented in section 4.4.1 above. Agents are thus described by means a joint density
function of income and the preference parameter, f(I;¯): Individuals locate in concentric
59rings, that are de¯ned by their distance of the CBD, ` = 0;`1;:::;`N; and have area equal to
one each. Self-selection of agents across these concentric rings is similar to what is analyzed
by Epple and Platt (1998). Basically, the outcome may be analyzed easily because the single-
crossing property of Ellickson (1971) holds. Strati¯cation of individuals would be stable if
individuals have no incentives to move across rings. The resulting strati¯cation is described
by de¯ning, in (I;¯) space, the loci of characteristics for individuals who are indi®erent
between locating in two successive rings, that is at distances `n;`n+1; n = 1;:::;N ¡ 1;
respectively. Let I = yn(¯) ´ yn (Rn;Rn+1;`n;`n+1;¯); be the nth strati¯cation envelope,
given rents and distances for two successive rings, (n;n + 1) and radii `n;`n+1: That is:
(I ¡ k`n)R
¡¯
n = (I ¡ k`n+1)R
¡¯
n+1;n = 0; :::;Ne:














It is straightforward to establish, by di®erentiating yn(¯) from (54) with respect to ¯; that
the strati¯cation envelope, I = yn(¯); is decreasing in both preference parameter ¯ and
the rent ratio Rn=Rn+1: Since the second derivative of the strati¯cation envelope function
with respect to the preference parameter is positive, then greater importance of housing
in preference implies that the strati¯cation loci are °atter and therefore all neighborhood
become more homogeneous with respect to housing, cet. par..
Since RN = RNe = Ra; which is given exogenously as the opportunity cost of land, it
follows that Rn declines with `n: For equilibrium in each ring, demand must equal supply.







f(I;¯)dI = 1: (55)
The LHS of this equation is monotonically increasing in and has a unique solution for
RN¡1
RN
the only unknown in (55). The solution may be written as:
RN¡1
RN = R(`N¡1;`N): Similarly,







f(I;¯)dI = 1; n = 1;:::;N ¡ 1: (56)







: Finally, the equa-







f(I;¯)dI = 1: (57)
The LHS in the above is monotonically decreasing in R1; and therefore (57) determines R1
R2:
Working recursively, we determine the entire sequence of housing rents and the number of
rings which are inhabited at equilibrium.
Finally, the strati¯cation envelope for each of the rings is determined. Therefore, land
use in this simple economy imply imperfect strati¯cation: land use is mixed. The case of
homogeneous preferences is, of course, a special case of this model. Once the strati¯cation
envelopes are determined, then the income distributions in each concentric ring follows as
truncated marginal distributions. That is, the distribution of income in ring n; de¯ned by







Roughly speaking, incomes and housing preferences are negatively correlated within each
neighborhood.
5 Hierarchical Models of Location with Social Interac-
tions
Next we discuss models of neighborhood choice, where the choice is over communities, de-
¯ned as governmental jurisdictions that provide local public goods and ¯nance them out of
local taxes. This class of papers involve preferences over characteristics of other residents
either directly or indirectly, via the package of public services. An important methodological
di®erence characterizing these papers is a formal structure of ordered, or hierarchical, choice
models. The analytics of these models in e®ect rest on a single unobservable, a preference
parameter, that underlies individuals' choices and their endogenous separation into distinct
communities. These models also employ data for populations aggregated at the governmen-
61tal jurisdiction or community-level. In contrast, the class of papers examined earlier in the
chapter typically employ micro data.
The analytical device that we saw is essential to understanding segregation in canonical
urban models with a CBD, the single-crossing property, is a general tool of analysis in
circumstances where agents self select. It continues to be useful here, as we see shortly.
A number of noteworthy papers, including several papers by Dennis Epple and coau-
thors such as Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984) and Epple and Romer (1990), and Benabou
(1993; 1996a; 1996b), Durlauf (1996a; 1996b), Epple and Platt (1998), and Epple and Ro-
mano (1998) emphasize the role of prices in bringing about rich sets of outcomes in the form
of segregated or uniform equilibria. Becker and Murphy (2000) discuss important concep-
tual issues associated with the distinct roles of price rationing, zoning or segregation via
government ¯at in neighborhood choice, when neighborhoods di®er in terms of exogenous
amenities and endogenous socioeconomic composition.
Benabou (1996a) shows that with two communities that are equal in size, which are
populated by individuals who di®er in terms of a scalar characteristic and who value the
community-speci¯c average of the characteristic, the only stable equilibrium neighborhood
outcome is segregated, if the marginal e®ect of the neighborhood contextual e®ect on the
neighborhood price is increasing in the own characteristic. That is, for segregation it is
required that individuals' willingness to pay for the neighborhood average of the individual
characteristic be increasing with that individual characteristic. This is in e®ect a complemen-
tarity condition between the individual characteristic and its community-level counterpart.
Durlauf (2004) notes that these models di®er considerably in the approach to neighborhood
structure, including ¯xed or endogenous size, the nature of housing market and how neigh-
borhood membership is decided. For example, Durlauf (1996a) allows for endogenous number
and size of neighborhoods, but imposes income requirements for neighborhood membership;
Durlauf (1996b) shows that house prices may support a strati¯ed outcome, when education
is ¯nanced by a community-based income tax and is sensitive to the neighborhood income
distribution.
625.1 The Epple{Sieg Class of Models
This class of papers include Epple and Sieg (1999), Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001), and
Calabrese et al. (2006). These authors start from a given total population, de¯ned in terms
of the distribution of individuals' demographic characteristics, who allocate themselves via
the housing market to a given number of distinct communities. The important di®erence that
distinguishes these models is provision of a community-level public good which is ¯nanced
through local taxation of housing. Covariation of preferences and income induces sorting.
In the Manski typology, such sorting is induced by correlated e®ects. Individuals who are
similar in terms of preferences and incomes tend to sort in the same community, with housing
prices re°ecting all available information and helping ration access to communities. However,
sorting is imperfect in these models, just as in real economic life: individuals with the same
income may be found in di®erent communities.
We assume that all individuals make decisions at the same time about where to locate
among ` = 1;:::;L communities. Individuals' preferences are de¯ned in terms of their
indirect utility functions, as functions of individual income I; of the price of housing in
community `, P`; an observable variable in principle, of the tax price for a local public good,
g`; and ² > 0; an individual characteristic. Following Epple and Sieg (1999), we assume an

























where: Ã < 0; ¹ < 0; ± > 0; and B > 0 are parameters that are constant across all
households.
To see how the assumption about preferences according to (58) serves to sustain sorting




















²gÃ¡1 > 0: (59)
These indi®erence curves are essential in characterizing neighborhood sorting for the follow-
63ing reason. Since they are monotonic in I and ²; they satisfy the single-crossing property
with respect to income, I; and to the taste parameter, ²; given I: As Epple and Sieg, op.
cit., show, this property is crucial for obtaining separating equilibria, with respect to both
income, I and the taste parameter, ²: To see this intuitively, consider the indirect indi®erence
curves for two values of income, I0; I00; I0 < I00; with the same value of ²: As the indi®erence
curve for I00 cuts the one for I0 from below, individuals with incomes equal to I00 are willing
to bid a higher value to locate in a community with higher value of P`; holding g` constant,
would be populated by households with higher incomes.
We index the L neighborhoods in individuals' opportunity sets, so that: g` < g`+1; P` <
P`+1; ` = 0;:::;L¡1: According to Epple and Sieg, op. cit. p. 651, there must be an order-
ing of communities that must be con¯rmed at equilibrium. 21 We assume that this indexing
coincides with the equilibrium ordering. We work out the speci¯cs of selection which is likely
to emerge under preferences (58). Next we seek to characterize the marginal density function
for income in community `, f`(I) in terms of a given joint density function of preferences
characteristics and income, f(I;²); across the population of the entire metropolitan area.
The set of individuals j 2 I` who reside in community ` are characterized by the set of
values (Ij;²j) such that:
V (Ij;P`¡1;g`¡1;²j) < V (Ij;P`;g`;²j) · V (Ij;P`+1;g`+1;²j): (60)





= `nI: It turns out that the boundary of communities ` and ` + 1 in (`nI;`n²)
space is the straight line given by `n² ¡ Ã`nI = Ck: Conditions (60) are transformed into:
C`¡1 + Ã`nI < `n² · C` + Ã`nI; (61)
























A;` = 1;:::;L ¡ 1: (62)
21This ordering must satisfy boundary indi®erence, income strati¯cation, and ascending bundles. That is,
if Pi > Pj; then gi > gj; i® community i is populated by higher income people than community j:
64Note that C` is increasing in g` and P`: Our assumptions about the ranking of the L
neighborhoods imply that the C`'s, which are functions of prices and public good lev-
els, (g`;P`;g`+1;P`+1); and of parameters, satisfy C`+1 > C`: For completeness, we de¯ne
C0 = ¡1; and CL = 1: Therefore, all information that is relevant for sorting of individuals
into communities is encapsulated in the auxiliary variables C`; C` = 1;:::;L:
The number of people who reside in community `; as a percentage of the total population
of the metropolitan area, is given by the probability over the set de¯ned by (61), which is
a function of (C`¡1;C`); and of the parameters of the joint distribution of income and taste
parameter, f(I;²):
The Epple and Sieg estimation method simply matches community-speci¯c populations
with those predicted from the sorting model. The package of public goods and the asso-
ciated tax rates may be endogenized once community decision making is modeled. This is
accomplished, for example, by Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001), who also employ the estimation
strategy of Epple and Sieg (1999) again for the communities of the Boston metropolitan area.
Speci¯cally, they use community-level data on population size, number of households, mean
income, median income, education expenditure, property tax rate, median property value,
median gross rent and fraction of renters. They estimate all behavioral parameters and the
distribution of income jointly with ²; the behavioral parameter that indexes heterogeneity.
The estimation approach rests on an index for a community-level public good (services),
in their case spending on education and community crime rates, and an instrument for a
community-speci¯c housing price that may be estimated from data on housing expenditures
(in their approach measured by owner-occupied housing or rents), incomes and property tax
rates. Community-speci¯c hedonic price equations could also deliver prices that may be used
in the estimation of the community sorting model.
The properties of the Epple{Sieg sorting model, as demonstrated by (61), are summarized
as follows. First, given the value of the taste parameter ²; individuals are perfectly strati¯ed
across communities in terms of income; and second, given income, individuals are perfectly
strati¯ed across communities in terms of taste. See Epple and Sieg, op. cit., p. 653, Figure
1. Consequently, individuals' taste and income are positively correlated across communities,
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community attribute and income are negatively correlated within communities, that is as we
move within each of the strips that de¯ne communities. See Epple and Platt (1998), p. 31,
Figure 3. Higher income people must have lower taste for the community attribute than
lower income people who reside in the same community. This is an interesting feature of the
theoretical model that has bearing upon the estimation.
Given parametric assumptions on the joint distribution of income and tastes for the
population of the metropolitan area, the model determines a joint distribution of income and
taste parameters for every community. If the model is evaluated at the correct parameter
values, the di®erence between the empirical quantiles of the income distributions observed
in the data and the quantiles predicted by the model should be small. This provides the
rationale for the ¯rst stage of the estimation. Heterogeneity in tastes and income in the
metropolitan population, together with self selection of households into municipalities, means
that income distributions will di®er across municipalities in the metropolitan area. This
allows them to estimate the parameters of the income distribution, the correlation of income
with the taste parameter, the ratio of Ã=¾`n²; and the income elasticity of housing demand.
The remaining parameters of the model are estimated by matching the observed distribution
of community-level tax rates, expenditures, and imputed rents. The baseline model with no
peer e®ects ¯ts reasonably well, but overstates expenditure in the lower-income communities
and understates them in the higher-income communities. The model over-predicts rents in
the lower-income communities and under-predicts them in the higher-income communities.
Epple and Sieg ¯nd that 89% of the total variance of income in the Boston metropolitan
area is accounted for by within community variance.22 They interpret this as evidence of
substantial unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for local public goods, in their case a
linear combination of school quality and crime. Their estimation of the joint distribution of
the taste parameter and income is done with great precision. All of the parameters of their
model are identi¯ed, although the elasticity of housing demand is identi¯ed \from nuances of
the functional form rather than from information on housing expenditures. Their estimates
22A similar observation was made by Hardman and Ioannides (2004) and Ioannides (2004).
66of ¹ are in the range of ¡0:30 to ¡0:50:
Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) test the political economy part of the model, that is,
whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by ma-
jority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice. Again, the model determines
a joint distribution of income and taste parameters for every community. The ¯rst stage
of the estimation strategy is based on the idea that the di®erence between the quantiles of
the income distributions, as observed in the data, and the quantiles, as predicted by the
model, should be small if the model is evaluated at the correct parameter values. Their
approach treats the auxiliary variables, the C`'s, as unknown parameters and estimates the
model using a minimum distance estimator. The basic idea of their locational equilibrium
estimator is to match the levels of public good provision implied by the ¯rst stage estimates
with those observed in the data, conditional on di®erences in housing prices. The estimator
controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households, observed and unob-
served characteristics of communities, and the potential endogeneity of housing prices and
public good expenditures. They estimate the structural parameters of the model using 1980
data from the Boston MSA. A key contribution here is to show that it is in fact possible
to estimate consistently the underlying parameters using orthogonality conditions derived
from majority rule. They extend the analysis to estimate jointly the orthogonality condi-
tions for majority rule and the orthogonality conditions for locational equilibrium. The ¯rst
tests a myopic voting model, according to which voters ignore all e®ects of migration and
treat the population boundaries of the communities as ¯xed. In other words, they believe
that the distribution of households across communities is not a®ected by a change in public
good provision. This model maps into the assumptions that the net-of-tax price of housing,
community population, and the aggregate housing demand are ¯xed. This model is rejected.
More sophisticated voting models based on utility-taking provide a potential explanation of
the main empirical regularities. This variation of their model incorporates mobility into the
computation of the government possibility frontier. Their estimates suggest that the implied
tradeo® between public good and housing price are similar for the mid range of the commu-
nities distribution and yet su±ciently di®erent at the both ends to support the conclusion
67of a much better ¯t for the utility-taking model.
5.2 Peer E®ects
The nature of the attractiveness of di®erent communities via preference over a publicly
provided community-level good explains sorting due to correlated e®ects, that is, individuals
with similar preferences will seek to reside in the same communities. It falls short, however,
of accounting for neighborhood e®ects that would re°ect the characteristics of individuals
who self-select into communities. Calabrese, Epple, Romer and Sieg (2006) specify the
community-speci¯c attribute in (58) as a neighborhood e®ect. The quality of the public
good is de¯ned as its physical quantity, ¹ g`; adjusted by the mean income of community `;
¹ I`; relative to that of the entire economy, ¹ I: That is:





where Á ¸ 0; is a parameter. In each community, the cost of the public good is ¯nanced by
a proportional tax on housing expenditure, which is decided by voting, as before. Although
the authors refer to this feature of their model as a peer e®ect, it is actually a contextual
e®ect according to the Manski typology.
These authors' empirical approach allows them to impose all restrictions that arise from
locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating pro-
cess. Recall the speci¯c features of the baseline model discussed above, namely that it tends
to over-predict housing values and under-predict expenditures in lower-income communities,
and the other way around for higher-income ones. These cause a severe under-prediction of
tax rates in poorer communities and over-prediction in higher-income ones. Interestingly,
these problems are ameliorated when peer e®ects are included. Expressing the exponent
of the quality function Á in relative terms, their estimates imply that the peer e®ects are
2.5 times as important as spending. Introducing peer e®ects into the model speci¯cation
markedly improves the ¯t of the model. The model with peer e®ects not only explains ex-
penditures, but also tax rates and tax bases (rents) reasonably well. In fact these authors
¯nd that the correlation between actual and predicted tax rates is 0:747; instead of ¡0:67 in
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good provision yields a good ¯t to the data.
Overall, they ¯nd that their relatively simple model of sorting and public good provision
¯ts the data on community income distributions, housing expenditures, public good provi-
sion levels and property tax rates reasonably well and that peer e®ects may be important
components in determining the quality of local public good provision.
Recall that Epple et al. (2001), working with a model where the public good is determined
through voting, found that the parameter estimates from the locational equilibrium and
voting equilibrium components of the model led to di®erent results that were di±cult to
reconcile. The results of Calabrese et al. op. cit., eliminates the apparent inconsistency.
Clearly, peer e®ects enhances the °exibility of the model. Lower income communities may
have a lower tax base but also face a lower quality of the public good on account of lower
relative income.
The authors discuss whether there exist any explanations other than peer e®ects that
might explain their earlier results. One possibility is features of the state ¯scal system that
introduce a wedge between a community's property tax as the marginal source of funds for
increasing educational expenditures in the model and the actual one. However, they argue
that that was not the case in Massachusetts at the time of their data, when state aid was
based on local property tax base and school enrollments had a redistributive e®ect.
The authors also discuss how peer e®ects would operate, if they are present. Peer e®ects
may be due either to production or consumption externalities. However, they could proxy
for endogenous social e®ects, in which case the model to be estimated may be considered a
reduced form in the context of the social interactions literature. Peer e®ects conceived at the
community level that have received particular emphasis are those operating through schools.
If that is the primary mechanism for peer e®ects, then one would expect that parents of
school-age children would tend to locate where the peer variable is higher, and households
without children would locate where the peer variable is relatively low. Mean household
income has a correlation coe±cient 0:57 with the fraction of households that are families,
0:32 with school enrollment per household, and ¡0:38 with the fraction of the population
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the education of the adult population may provide a measure both of the value attached
to education and of the resources available to facilitate student learning. The authors in-
vestigate this by regressing, across communities, the logarithm of mean household income
on a constant, the fraction of the population with high school education, and the fraction
with more than high school education. All estimated coe±cients are highly signi¯cant, and
the R2 = 0:83: Thus, their peer variable, mean community income, is strongly related to
the education of the community population. While the evidence is only suggestive, it is
consistent with the peer e®ects interpretation of the results from their structural estimation.
As Epple, Peress, and Sieg (2005) emphasize that, in this class of community-choice
models, the hierarchical nature of community choice is an important ingredient of the model.
The ascending bundles property of public goods and tax rates determines sorting by jointly
summarizing the value for households of living in di®erent communities and rationing demand
accordingly. In this paper, the authors discuss identi¯cation and estimation of hierarchical
equilibrium models in semi-parametric frameworks and extend into a broad class of non-
hierarchical models. Their results suggest that identi¯cation of non-hierarchical models may
ultimately have to rely on stronger assumptions on the distribution of unobserved tastes for
public goods than those used in hierarchical models.
These authors apply the Epple et al. type of model to community choice and housing
demand, using data on 93,763 properties in 150 or so communities (which include the wards
of the City of Pittsburgh) in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The data include detailed
price and quality characteristics for dwelling units. In addition, they use data on community
characteristics based on educational standards, crime and travel time to the city center. They
estimate housing prices, using dwelling unit data, and the parameters of housing demand,
using Census data aggregated at the community level, taking advantage of the quantiles of
housing consumption and income distributions available within the Census data. Next they
estimate a function of product quality, as a function of housing prices (imputed rents). They
characterize the observed sorting of household types across communities, implied by these
probabilities, by plotting the share of di®erent types of households with given incomes who
70live in communities which have housing prices less than or equal to the price of community
`: These plots show that households with children are more responsive to di®erences in
housing prices (and local public good provision) than those without children, households
with and without children being the two speci¯c types used to demonstrate the method.
The sorting of households with children exhibits more strati¯cation by income than those
without children. They also ¯nd that households with children and income levels below the
mean metropolitan income are more likely to live in cheaper communities than households
without children. The opposite is true for households with high levels of incomes. High
income households with children have stronger preferences for high price (and high amenity)
communities than households without children. They complete the identi¯cation of the
model and thus demonstrate that their framework is rich enough to uncover import features
of residential sorting which would have obscured by conventional parametric estimators.
We have dwelled extensively on the Epple{Sieg approach because we regard as an im-
portant framework in evaluating how attractiveness of communities may be related to social
interactions within communities, even when that might not be speci¯cally spelled out. When
considered against hedonic-type models, the housing price again does double duty, by pric-
ing housing and the right to live in a community. In the case of the earlier Epple and Sieg
approach, the discreteness of the choice set limits the identi¯cation of the model, whereas
in the hedonic approach, and the latest Epple and Sieg type application, just discussed, the
¯rst order conditions are exploited in order to estimate the hedonic model. We return to
this further below. We note, in particular, that sorting works here only through individuals'
valuation of community-speci¯c amenities and not neighborhood e®ects as such. Of course,
when applied to smaller communities, those two approaches may be close substitutes.
Finally, we discuss brie°y an approach that combines micro with aggregate data [Ioan-
nides and Schmidheiny (2006)]. These authors develop a model of community choice as
discrete choice by combining features of the approach by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995;
2004) to the choice of di®erentiated goods with the approach of Epple and Sieg (1999) and
of Epple et al. (2001; 2006). The paper reports estimation results that involve an iterative
procedure consisting of two stages. At a ¯rst stage, they use information on the joint dis-
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are obtained from the American Housing Survey Boston metropolitan area micro sample, to
predict population shares and moments of household characteristics and to match them with
observed population shares and moments by community by means of a generalized method
of moments method. This stage uses estimates of e®ects re°ecting interactions between in-
dividual and community characteristics and estimates community-speci¯c intercepts. These
intercepts serve as su±cient statistics for the estimation, at a second stage, of coe±cients ex-
pressing the e®ects of community-speci¯c characteristics by regressing them on the marginal
distributions of household characteristics of the di®erent communities in Boston metropoli-
tan area in 1980. The latter is the same data set from the US Census that Epple et al.
have also used, but is augmented by means of community-speci¯c housing prices, which are
obtained from the record of all transactions in the respective communities within the Boston
metropolitan area. Their results are noteworthy because they demonstrate that use of two
public sources of data may circumvent the need of con¯dential data that some other research
has relied on. It also demonstrates the potential for use of additional information in the form
of additional moment conditions associated with the distributions of observable household
characteristics.
6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a number of approaches that economists have used in studying neigh-
borhood e®ects in housing markets. It also aims, to an extent that might be possible, at
unifying these approaches. It emphasizes how individuals in e®ect choose neighborhood ef-
fects, or more generally social interactions, by means of their location decisions. Instead of
emphasizing the role of neighborhood e®ects as mere externalities that might interfere with
locational equilibrium, this chapter looks constructively at neighborhood e®ects and focuses
on what we have learned empirically about their role by observing locational decisions or
patterns along with individual and group characteristics.
We examine several classes of models which economists have relied upon in exploring
72the role and empirical signi¯cance of neighborhood e®ects that originate in housing mar-
kets. So, we take the concept of neighborhood e®ects quite literally as arising in residential
neighborhoods. For precisely this reason, the chapter emphasizes how we may detect em-
pirically the presence of neighborhood e®ects when they may be priced by housing markets
and be capitalized into housing values and rents. The chapter thus focuses on models of pri-
marily empirical relevance that may help identify neighborhood e®ects and discusses actual
empirical ¯ndings.
The ¯rst class of models we examine involves models of choice over discrete sets of
individual dwelling units that allow for a multidimensional bundle of characteristics. Models
of these types, which borrow from the industrial organization literature and especially the
Berry{Levisohn{Pakes characteristics-based models, have been developed by Bayer and a
number of coauthors. They lead naturally to hedonic models while sorting is accounted
for. In the context of the neighborhood e®ects literature, these models allow for endogenous
contextual e®ects. We pursue further a conceptually related approach, due to Nesheim,
that also endogenizes contextual e®ects but involves much lower dimensionality. That is,
individuals choose neighborhoods while recognizing that their neighbors' characteristics along
with their own determine educational outcomes for their children. This approach allows us
to obtain equilibrium housing price functions that are consistent with hedonic valuation of
neighborhood attributes.
The paper turns next to aspatial models of neighborhood choice, with endogenous and
contextual neighborhood e®ects, and housing demand (with housing is measured as a scalar)
as joint decisions. It emphasizes a model, due to Ioannides and Zabel, which is designed to
utilize individual and neighborhood-level data at several levels of aggregation. This approach
links naturally with hierarchical choice models. Hierarchical models of neighborhood loca-
tion in the presence of social interactions, as developed by Epple and co-authors, describe
communities in terms of a low-dimensional vector of attributes that may be aggregated into
a public good. Individuals' choice of community is subject to community-speci¯c housing
price and tax rate, which at equilibrium must sustain individuals' choices. This approach
is designed to utilize data that are aggregated at the community-level, along with informa-
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individuals. When considered against hedonic-type models, the housing price again does
double duty, by pricing housing and \admission" into a community. In these models, sorting
across communities works either only through individuals' valuation of community-speci¯c
amenities or with community-speci¯c amenities combined with neighborhood e®ects in the
form of peer e®ects.
The chapter takes up neighborhood e®ects within the canonical Alonso{Mills{Muth ur-
ban model with a well de¯ned spatial structure and individuals commuting to a predeter-
mined central business district. If individuals di®er with respect to income or preference
characteristics, then the standard urban model implies segregation. The paper discusses ex-
tensions of the model that allow for amenities, that may be exogenous or endogenous and are
spatially dispersed, and naturally in°uence individuals' location decisions and the associated
housing price structure.
Although many of the models presented in this chapter may seem very special, they
provide, we think, the building blocks for a full understanding of neighborhood e®ects in
housing markets. And quite importantly, a full understanding of neighborhood e®ects in
housing markets is crucial for evaluating the allocative role of prices when they ration ad-
mission to communities and neighborhoods. This natural interface with hedonic theory,
which has received a lot of attention here, is essential in assessing what can be learned from
empirical analyses.
At the same time, many of the results discussed here suggest that the concept of neigh-
borhood is multifaceted. Individuals indeed care about the quality of neighborhoods at
several levels (\scales"). The information at the such traditional levels as clusters, tracts
and MSAs can be highly correlated, but there is also independent information at those dif-
ferent levels. This accords with the notion that di®erent small neighborhoods have di®erent
characters, and their proximity to one another confer character to higher-level neighborhoods
that contain them. The literature has yet to develop e®ective measures of these aspects, but
hopefully the approaches discussed in this chapter constitute a start.
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